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Efforts to address the decline of coastal and habitat resources by Coastal Resource 
Management (CRM) initiatives are done via application of frameworks such as Integrated 
Coastal Management (ICM) and Ecosystem Based Management (EBM). Recent literature 
stresses the necessity to complement biological monitoring with social science 
monitoring of coastal areas by applying social science concepts in CRM. Linkages 
between social science concepts such as a conflict, acceptance, and public support for 
CRM with research themes of governance, communities, and socioeconomics are crucial 
for advancing our understanding of the social success of CRM initiatives. In light of the 
scholarly and applied need, this thesis focuses on analyzing stakeholder perceptions, 
conflict, and public support for CRM policies and initiatives in Southern Cebu, 
Philippines. In particular, this thesis examines stakeholder attitudes and normative beliefs 
of CRM scenarios, and links these perceptions with public support of CRM policies and 
initiatives implemented at the levels of the community, municipality, and the Marine 
Protected Area (MPA) Network. 
This thesis presents two manuscripts applying qualitative and quantitative social 
science methods for understanding stakeholder perceptions of conflict, acceptance, and 
public support for CRM policies. The first manuscript applies the Potential for Conflict 
iii 
 
Index (PCI2), a statistic that graphically displays the amount of consensus and the 
potential for conflict to occur in a CRM scenario. Specifically, the PCI2 displays fishers’ 
normative beliefs concerning their consensus and acceptability of CRM policies and 
initiatives. Face-to-face interviews with fishers serve as data for calculating the PCI2. 
This manuscript compares fishers’ normative beliefs concerning their evaluations of 
CRM policies among the municipalities of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan in Southern 
Cebu. Overall, fishers’ differing evaluations reflects the way CRM is implemented and 
enforced in each of these municipalities. Fishers’ evaluations allow local governments to 
understand acceptability of CRM policies as well as make better management decisions 
concerning policy compliance, consensus for policies, and conflict within a municipality.  
 The second manuscript of this thesis applies qualitative conflict mapping methods 
to the investigation of institutional conflict and accountability within a coastal 
municipality in Southern Cebu. Using in-depth interviews, conflict mapping methods 
enables the analysis of stakeholder attitudes of institutional conflict and accountability for 
CRM. This manuscript investigates institutional relationships among stakeholders 
accountable for CRM. Lastly, this manuscript examines how institutional relationships 
and stakeholder perceptions affect CRM at the community, municipality, and the MPA 
Network. The interpretive analysis reveals that conflicts concerning institutional 
accountability for CRM are often at the root of problems for implementing and enforcing 
coastal management initiatives and policies within the different communities of the 
municipality.  
 Theoretical implications of this thesis include the application of normative theories 
and qualitative conflict analysis frameworks for understanding stakeholder perceptions of 
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conflict and public support for CRM initiatives. Managerial applications of this thesis 
include the use of quantitative (PCI2) and qualitative (conflict mapping) social science 
monitoring methods applicable for understanding social science concepts such as 
stakeholder perceptions, conflict, and public support for CRM policies and initiatives. 
Future studies could include the combined use of PCI2 and conflict mapping as 
complementary research methods for investigating collaborative local government 
decision making processes crucial for the social success of CRM initiatives.  
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Colorado State University 
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More than half of the world’s population lives along the coast that accounts for 
only 10% of the world’s land, creating intense pressure on habitat and resources 
(Murawski et al., 2008). The sustainable use of coastal resources and the decline of 
marine ecosystems is a global concern. Habitat degradation, pollutant runoff, overfishing, 
and climate change impacts contribute to food security issues and ecosystem collapse in 
major coastal and ocean regions of the world (The Nature Conservancy [TNC] et al., 
2008). 
With over 20,000 km
2
 of coastal ecosystems, the Philippines contain the greatest 
number of fish species within the world’s most marine diverse area, the Indo-Malay 
Philippines archipelago (Carpenter & Springer, 2004). Despite this fact, the coastal 
situation in the Philippines reflects global trends where unsustainable use of coastal 
resources results in mass habitat destruction, pollution, and declining fisheries. Locals 
whose livelihoods depend on the degraded and diminishing coastal resources are 
significantly affected. Consequently, food security has become a significant issue for 
many Filipinos.  
World efforts address these coastal issues through 
 Coastal Resource Management (CRM) applying the frameworks of Integrated 
Coastal Management (ICM) and Ecosystem Based Management (EBM). Both ICM and 
EBM frameworks address these coastal issues by preserving and restoring ecosystem 
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functions as well as encouraging the sustainable use of coastal resources (Murawski et al, 
2008). ICM, the precursor for EBM, entails activities that sustainably manage 
economically and ecologically valuable marine resources with the integration of 
community-based approaches and the understanding of 
human interaction toward managing shared resources (Christie et al., 2005). Meanwhile, 
EBM is defined as: 
An approach that considers the entire ecosystem, including humans. The 
goals of EBM are to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive, and 
resilient condition so that it can provide the services humans want and 
need. (Macleod, Lubchenco, Palumbi, and Rosenberg, 2005, p. 1) 
The frameworks of ICM and EBM share common goals and objectives that intend to 
achieve the overall outcome of sustaining coastal ecosystem function by integrating 
community-based approaches, governance, and the socioeconomics of CRM. 
Common CRM tools are Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) used for fisheries 
management, biodiversity conservation, and habitat restoration (Christie & White, 2007). 
In the Philippines, MPAs are in the form of a sanctuary commonly called sanktuaryo that 
is strictly off-limits for extractive utilization. Christie and White (2007) state the 
importance of the recognition that an MPA is only one important strategy within the 
framework of CRM. CRM regimes need to extend beyond the MPA borders, particularly 
for developing countries such as the Philippines where MPAs are small and managed at 
the local level (Balgos, 2005; Christie &White, 2007; McClanahan et al., 2005; Salm & 
Clark, 2000; White, Christie, d’Agnes, Lowry, & Milne, 2005; World Bank, 2006). 
Currently, CRM extends beyond MPA borders through the implementation of policies 
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and initiatives not only applicable to the MPA, but to the entire jurisdictional waters of a 
municipality. Some of these policies and initiatives primarily involve fish gear and 
method regulations, fishing permits, and restricted access to commercial fishing within 
municipal waters. The scaling up of these initiatives and policies from the MPAs at the 
community level to the municipal level sets the pace for the implementation of EBM 
across coastal waters of several municipalities. Moreover, the formation of MPA 
Networks, an ecological network of MPAs and a social network of local governments 
representing different municipalities, allows collaborative governance and management 
crossing jurisdictional coastal boundaries (Figure 1). Overall, MPA Network initiatives 
result in biological impacts to the coastal resources and social impacts to the different 
communities across a network of municipalities. 
 
Figure 1. Scales of coastal management and governance representing stakeholders from 
the community, municipality, and MPA Network 
The success of MPAs and CRM outcomes are often determined by biological 
monitoring efforts. As a result, the success of these management outcomes have been 
primarily measured and evaluated on specific biological indicators such as species 
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diversity and richness. However, applied experience and the literature have emphasized 
the significance of social indicators, such as public support, stakeholder attitudes, and 
conflict management, in driving the long-term success of CRM initiatives (Charles & 
Wilson 2009; Christie et al., 2003; Pomeroy et al., 2006; Walmsely & White, 2003).  
According to Christie (2003), the lack of public support leads to low compliance rates for 
CRM rules resulting in costly long-term conservation goals. 
Public support for CRM outcomes and MPAs are influenced by stakeholder 
perceptions of the CRM initiatives and policies intended to reap ecological and social 
benefits. However, understanding stakeholder perceptions of CRM involves an in-depth 
analysis of stakeholder attitudes and normative beliefs of the acceptability for specific 
CRM initiatives and policies. As an attempt to understand public support for CRM, the 
purpose of this study is to understand stakeholder perceptions regarding the acceptability 
of CRM policies and initiatives. Stakeholder perceptions include attitudes and normative 
beliefs serving as factors for conflict and acceptability of regulations that may influence 
public support for CRM. The conceptual framework shows linkages of stakeholder 
perspectives with conflict, acceptability, and public support for CRM (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework showing linkages of stakeholder perceptions with public 
support for CRM. 
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Throughout the literature, there has been substantial emphasis on the need for 
public support, participatory and community-based approaches, conflict management, 
local governance, and the understanding of socioeconomics in approaching CRM. 
However, there is also the lack of integrating social psychology concepts of stakeholder 
perceptions with well-published themes of governance, communities, and 
socioeconomics in CRM. Integrating these social science concepts in CRM requires 
social science monitoring, an academic and managerial process often left out in 
evaluating MPAs and coastal areas (Christie, Buhat, Garces, & White 2003). As an 
attempt to bridge these social science concepts in coastal management, the motive behind 
this study is to apply social science monitoring methods into CRM by using quantitative 
and qualitative social science methods. These methods would link stakeholder 
perceptions, including normative beliefs and attitudes, with the in-depth investigation of 
conflict, consensus, acceptability, and public support for CRM policies and initiatives. 
The research themes of governance, socioeconomics, and community-based approaches 
in coastal management are linked with stakeholder perceptions and public support for 
CRM policies and initiatives. 
Thesis Organization 
In light of the scholarly and applied need to link social science concepts in CRM, 
this study focuses on analyzing stakeholder perceptions, conflict, and public support for 
CRM policies and initiatives. Included in this thesis is a literature review focused on the 
social aspects or the human dimension research themes of CRM, including the study of 
communities and community-based approaches, governance, socioeconomics, and 
stakeholder perceptions. Moreover, the literature review links stakeholder perceptions, 
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including the role of attitudes, normative beliefs, conflict, and public support with 
overarching research themes such as governance, CRM community-based approaches, 
and socioeconomics.  
 The organization of this thesis includes a two-manuscript format each focusing on 
quantitative and qualitative social science methods and analyses applicable to CRM. Both 
manuscripts investigate concepts concerning stakeholder perceptions (normative beliefs 
and attitudes), conflict, consensus, and public support for coastal management policies 
and initiatives (Figure 2). The first manuscript focuses on normative beliefs of fishers 
concerning the acceptability of coastal management policies and initiatives. Research 
questions in the first manuscript include:  1) What are fishers’ norms concerning the 
acceptability of CRM policies? 2) How do fishers’ norms of CRM policies differ among 
coastal municipalities? 3) How much local consensus is present concerning the 
acceptability of CRM policies among the municipalities? 4) How does consensus for 
CRM policies differ among municipalities?  The second manuscript focuses on the 
stakeholder perceptions and attitudes of institutional conflict and accountability 
concerning CRM. Research questions in the second manuscript include: (1) What are the 
stakeholder perceptions, including attitudes of institutional accountability and conflict 
regarding CRM? 2) What are CRM institutional relationships among stakeholders who are 
accountable for CRM? 3) How do these stakeholder perceptions and relationships impact 
CRM, including the co-management approach at the community, municipality, and the 
MPA Network scales? Qualitative social science methods are primarily applied in the 
second manuscript of this thesis. 
 In addition to the two manuscripts, a management report for Coastal Conservation 
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Education Foundation (CCEF) is included (Appendix A). For managerial applications of 
this thesis, the report summarizes survey results and management implications obtained 
from Manuscript I of this thesis.  
 The conclusion chapter bridges both qualitative and quantitative research questions 
addressing stakeholder perceptions of CRM policies, conflict, and management 
implications affecting the scales of the community, municipality, and MPA Network. 
Moreover, the conclusion chapter applies thesis results to managerial implications linked 
with governance, community-based approaches, and socioeconomics of CRM.
 8 
References
Balgos, M. (2005). Integrated Coastal Management and Marine Protected Areas in the 
Philippines: Concurrent Developments. Ocean & Coastal Management, 48, 
972-995. 
Carpenter, K., & Springer, V.G. (2005). The center of the center of marine shore fish 
biodiversity: the Philippine Islands. Environmental Biology of Fishes, 72, 467-
480. 
Charles, A. & Wilson, L. (2009). Human dimensions of Marine Protected Areas. ICES 
Journal of Marine Science, 66, 6-15. 
Christie, P., Buhat D., Garces L.R., & White, A.T. (2003) The Challenges and Rewards 
of Community-based Coastal Resources Management: San Salvador Island 
Philippines. In Brechin SR, Wilshusen PR, Fort-Wangler PR, West PC (eds) 
Contested nature- promoting national biodiversity conservation with social 
justice in the 21
st
 century (pp. 231-249). SUNY Press, New York.  
Christie, P., McCay, B.J., Miller, M.L., Lowe, C., White, A.T., Stoffle, R., Fluharty, 
D.L., Talaue-McManus, L., Chuenpagdee, R., Pomeroy, C., Suman, D.O., 
Blount, B.G., Huppert, D., Villahermosa Eisma, R.L., Oracion, E., Lowry, K.,  
& Pollnac, R.B. (2003). Toward developing a complete understanding: A social 




Christie, P., Lowry, K., White, A.T., Oracion, E.G., Sievanen, L., Pomeroy, R.S., 
Pollnac, R.B., Patlis, J. & Eisma, L. (2005). Key findings from a 
multidisciplinary examination of integrated coastal management process 
sustainability. Ocean and Coastal Management, 48, 468-483. 
Christie, P. (2005). Observed and Perceived environmental impacts in Marine Protected 
Areas in two Southeast Asia sites. Ocean & Coastal Management, 48, 252–270. 
Christie P. & White A.T. (2007) Best practices for improved governance of coral reef 
marine protected areas. Coral Reefs, 26, 1047-1056. 
McLeod, K. L., Lubchenco, J., Palumbi, S.R., and Rosenberg, A.A. (2005). Scientific 
Consensus Statement on Marine Ecosystem-Based Management. 
Communication Partnership for Science and the Sea. Available at 
http://compassonline.org/pdf files/EBM Consensus Statement v12.pdf (accessed 
April 23, 2010). 
Murawski, S., Cyr N., Davidson, M., Hart, Z., NOAA, Bargos, M., Wowk, K., & Cicin-
Sain, B., Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts, and Islands. (2008, April). Policy 
brief on ecosystem based management and integrated coastal and ocean 
Management : Indicators for progress. Fourth Global Conference on Oceans, 
Coasts, and Islands. 
Pomeroy, R.S., & Riviera- Guieb, R. (2006). Fisheries co-management: a practical 
handbook. Ottawa: International Development Research Center. Available at  
Salm R.V. & Clark J.R. (2000). Marine and Coastal Protected Areas: A guide for 
planners and managers. IUCN. Gland, Switzerland. 
 10 
TNC (The Nature Conservancy), WWF (World Wildlife Fund), CI (Conservation 
International) and WCS (Wildlife Conservation Society). (2008). Marine 
protected area networks in the Coral Triangle: development and lessons. TNC, 
WWF, CI, WCS and the United States Agency for International Development, 
Cebu City, Philippines. 106. 
Walmsley S.F. & White, A.T. (2003). Influence of social, management, and 
enforcement factor on the long-term ecological effects of marine sanctuaries. 
Environmental Conservation, 30 (4): 388-407.  
White A.T., Christie P., d’Agnes, H., Lowry, K, & Milne, N. (2005). Designing ICM 
projects for sustainability: Lessons from the Philippines and Indonesia. Ocean 
and Coastal Management, 48, 271-296.  
World Bank. (2006). Scaling up marine management: The role of marine protected areas 




 The success of Coastal Resource Management (CRM) is dependent on the 
integration of social factors into coastal management plans. Failure to sufficiently address 
social factors or the human dimension of CRM and MPAs is the greatest single barrier in 
marine conservation today (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Coastal 
Services Center [NOAA CSC], 2005). Human dimension factors, such as stakeholder 
support and acceptability of coastal policies are crucial for the success of CRM programs 
intended to reap biological and social benefits (Walmsely & White, 2005). Ecosystem 
based Management (EBM) and Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), serving as 
frameworks for CRM, enables the in-depth analysis of human dimension research themes 
of governance, communities, stakeholder perceptions of policies, and socioeconomics. 
Figure 3 shows how these themes fit within the larger framework of coastal management. 
 This literature review explores the human dimension themes of CRM and 
investigates the gaps and linkages that these themes have with stakeholder support for 
CRM policies and initiatives. Furthermore, this review probes into the less explored social 
psychology theme of stakeholder perceptions, including attitudes and normative beliefs, 
and links stakeholder perceptions with public support and acceptability for CRM 
initiatives and policies. Lastly, this review links human dimension research themes of 




Figure 3. Literature map showing human dimension research themes of CRM 
Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) and Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) 
EBM and ICM, serving as frameworks for coastal management, have common 
goals of sustaining coastal ecosystem function by achieving the balance of environmental 
and socioeconomic goals (Christie et al., 2009). ICM, the precursor for EBM, entails 
“those activities that achieve sustainable use and management of economically and 
ecologically valuable resources in coastal areas that consider interaction among and within 
resource systems as well as interaction between humans and their environment” (Christie 
et al., 2005, p. 469). Furthermore, ICM involves the equal integration of ecological and 
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social methods that incorporate efforts to sustain coastal resources through stakeholder 
involvement and participation.  
 EBM evaluates the entire ecosystem while attempting to regulate and manage the 
health of the system, as well as balancing the environmental and economic concerns 
(Christie et al., 2009). EBM moves beyond the management of a single species approach 
and considers cumulative impacts and interdependence of different sectors, including 
ecological, social, economic, and institutional perspectives. Actions consistent with EBM 
include the initiation of ecosystem level planning, the establishment of cross-jurisdictional 
management goals, co-management, adaptive management strategies, and the 
establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and MPA Networks (McLeod, 
Lubchenco, Palumbi, & Rosenberg, 2005). 
MPAs and MPA Networks are one of the common coastal management tools used 
for fisheries management, biodiversity conservation, habitat restoration, and fisheries 
management (Christie & White, 2007). A commonly cited definition of MPAs is 
described below:  
An area of intertidal or subtidal terrain together its overlying water and 
associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has been 
reserved by law or other effective means to protected part or all of the 
enclosed environment (Resolution 17.38 of the IUCN general assembly 
[1988] reaffirmed in Resolution 19:46 [1994]). 
Because many MPAs are small (approximately 20 hectares or less) in the Philippines, 
many of these are no-take MPAs where extraction of any resource is prohibited. 
Therefore, zoning for these small MPAs is not practical as it is for zoning municipal 
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waters. Zoning and enforcing regulations on municipal waters become a greater challenge 
for municipal local governments. Furthermore, managing MPAs that are neighboring 
different municipalities requires collaboration with different municipal local governments. 
The formation of MPA Networks has addressed some of these management challenges. 
MPA Networks are defined as the following: 
A collection of individual marine protected areas operating cooperatively 
and synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of protection 
levels, in order to fulfill ecological aims more effectively and 
comprehensively than individual sites could alone. The network will also 
display social and economic benefits, though the latter may only become 
fully developed over long time frames as ecosystems recover. (World 
Commission on Protected Areas and World Conservation Union 
[WCPA/IUCN], 2007, p. 3) 
MPA Networks have resulted out of the need for CRM regimes to extend beyond MPA 
borders. Moreover, MPA Networks allow local governments to attain support from 
neighboring municipalities and NGOs to address management issues common to member 
municipalities of the MPA Network. Currently, MPA Networks in the Philippines serve as 
a social network of municipal local governments that collaboratively govern and manage 
coastal issues crossing jurisdictional coastal boundaries. In this case, MPA Networks in 
the Philippines represent socioecological MPA networks that are defined in the following 
manner: 
A collection of individual marine protected areas, management institutions 
and constituencies operating cooperatively and synergistically, at various 
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spatial scales, and with a range of protection levels, in order to fulfill 
ecological, social, economic, and governance aims more effectively and 
comprehensively than individual sites could alone. (Christie et al., 2009, p. 
351) 
MPA Networks are used as crucial tools for enabling local governments to manage and 
enforce coastal policies applicable to several MPAs and municipal waters. The scaling up 
of these initiatives and policies from the MPAs at the community level to the municipal 
level sets the pace for implementing EBM across several municipal waters. Overall, MPA 
Network initiatives result in biological impacts to the coastal resources and social impacts 
to the different communities across a network of municipalities governing and managing 
their coastal waters. 
 Despite the substantial literature on MPAs and the burgeoning use of MPA 
Networks, much of the literature in EBM is heavily grounded in ecological principles 
with the overall goal of increasing coastal resource yield.  Christie et al. (2009) has 
expressed this view: 
It is clear from a review of the literature and the aforementioned 
definitions that MPA networks are primarily designed and assessed with 
ecological principles in mind and intended to attain ecological goals that 
may eventually result in social and ecological benefits. (p. 351) 
Municipal and community local governments do not necessarily manage MPAs and MPA 
Networks with purely ecological principles and goals in mind. In practice, MPA 
Networks serve as social networks and information diffusion networks for local 
governments to effectively manage their MPA and surrounding municipal waters (Pietri, 
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Christie, Pollnac, Diaz, & Sabonsolin, 2009). The incongruence between the literature on 
MPA Networks, MPAs, and EBM with actual practices and management scenarios calls 
for further investigation on the human dimensions of CRM initiatives. 
Addressing the gaps and needs for Human Dimensions Research in CRM  
Although the Philippines has one of the richest experiences in the establishment of 
MPAs and CRM programs, there is still the profound need to expand research efforts at 
understanding the human dimensions of coastal management (White, Courtney, & 
Salamanca, 2002). Moreover, there is the need for the expansion of social goals such as 
community empowerment in achieving long-term success of MPAs and MPA Networks 
(Christie, Buhat, Garces, & White, 2003). Several studies show there are limitations and 
adverse consequences to evaluating MPAs solely on a biological basis. Christie (2004) has 
conducted studies on MPAs that are considered to be biologically successful and yet 
“social failures” because of the lack of incorporating social goals in the management plan 
(p.155).  Biological successful MPAs meet biological goals by increasing biodiversity and 
population of key coastal resources. On the other hand, social goals could include 
empowerment of local communities, community-based participation and decision-making 
as well as consistent social science monitoring displaying the basis of opinions, 
perspectives, and values of stakeholders (Christie et al., 2003).  The contradiction between 
biological and social goals, as well as the controversy and conflict dynamics influence the 
almost 90% MPA failure rate in some countries (Christie et al., 2003a; White et al., 2002).  
MPAs that do not include or fail to meet social goals result in social harm, conflict, 
economic issues, and social dislocation or displacement for poverty stricken communities 
in the Philippines (Christie, 2004; Mowforth & Munt, 2006). Consequently, community 
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support and local enforcement for MPAs decrease when management is no longer 
community-based (Christie, 2004, Sanderson & Koester, 2000; Trist, 1999).   
The understanding of community dynamics and its link with the management of 
coastal resources craves for social science research methods that are underemployed in 
many CRM strategies. The focus on only biological goals and the lack of social science 
research as part of the MPA agenda results in the omission of human responses to MPAs 
and MPA Networks in the scientific literature (Christie, 2004; Mascia et al., 2003). As a 
result, stakeholder conflict associated with different forms of resource utilization within 
MPAs is often underrepresented from MPA literature (Christie, 2004).  
The incorporation of human dimensions research into CRM enables stakeholders 
to meet social goals and perhaps biological goals in MPA management initiatives. The 
NOAA Coastal Services and National Protected Area Center (2005) provides a structure 
for incorporating social science themes or human dimensions research into coastal 
management. Social science themes include the analysis of communities, governance, 
socioeconomics, use patterns, submerged cultural resources, and attitudes as it pertains to 
MPAs and coastal management. To analyze social science or human dimension research 
themes of CRM and MPAs, I focus on communities, governance, socioeconomics, and 
stakeholder perceptions, including attitudes and normative beliefs of MPAs and CRM. 
Communities 
Past lessons from the establishment of MPAs and CRM initiatives in the 
Philippines include the importance of community participation; hence the establishment of 
community-based MPAs. The community or barangay local government along with 
fishers or People’s Organizations (POs) collectively manages community-based MPAs in 
 18 
the Philippines. Community-based coastal resource management incorporates a 
transparent and iterative process that includes problem identification, community 
organizing, education, stakeholder participation, and leadership development as a 
mechanism for facing economic and political issues localized within a community 
(Alcala, 1998; Christie, White, & Deguit, 2002; Ferrer, Polotan, & Domingo, 1996; Wells 
& White, 1995; White, Hale, Renard, & Cortesi, 1994). The establishment of small 
community-controlled MPAs is initially intended to protect coastal resources and 
consequently improve socio-economic opportunities such as increased fish yield and 
additional forms of livelihood such as tourism (Christie et al., 2002). 
Municipality-based MPAs are those that are controlled by the municipality’s local 
government with assistance from POs representing different communities. While many of 
the MPAs started as community-based MPAs, the majority of MPAs in the Philippines 
have shifted from being community-based to municipality-based. This shift in power and 
management is partly attributed to the legal mandate and capacity of the municipal local 
government to formulate local coastal ordinances affecting the management of their 
jurisdictional municipal waters. Another reason for this shift in management is due to the 
greater availability of funds that the municipal local government provides to the different 
communities. Some of these funds come from NGO grants, diver user fees, national 
government grants, and beach resort business taxes. 
Despite the shift from community-controlled MPAs to municipality-controlled 
MPAs, participatory approaches in CRM are applied in varying degrees. Some of these 
participatory approaches include sharing of stakeholder knowledge and community 
organizing by NGO sponsored facilitators. These participatory approaches are intended to 
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reap transparency of management processes, community empowerment, voluntary 
compliance, and social capital among the different communities residing or neighboring 
the municipality-based MPA. 
Pollnac, Crawford, and Gorscope (2001) determined six factors for overall social 
success of community and municipality-based MPAs in the Philippines. Some of these 
included a relatively high level of community participation in decision-making as well as 
ongoing support, input, and advice from institutions (e.g. NGOs) and the local 
government (NOAA CSC, 2005). Pretty’s (1995) typology of participation describes 
different levels of participation with passive participation at the initial level and self-
mobilization and connectedness at the desired level (Mowforth & Munt, 2003). Passive 
participation entails people participating by being told what has been decided upon. Self-
mobilization and connectedness involves people participating by taking initiatives 
independent of external institutions to change systems. Contracts with external institutions 
are developed but retain control over resource use. Self-mobilization and connectedness is 
the outcome desired by managers, NGOs, and local communities in implementing MPA 
initiatives and CRM policies. 
Timing is critical in incorporating community participation and collaboration 
during the establishment of MPAs and CRM programs.  Without the initial community 
collaboration in MPA and CRM program establishment, long-term community support for 
enforcing coastal management initiatives are lost. A classic case study is Apo Island, a 78-
hectare volcanic island surrounded by 1.6 km
2
 of fringing coral reef located five 
kilometers southeast of the mainland Negros, Philippines (Russ & Alcala, 1999).  Apo 
Island has approximately 800 residents and is governed by the municipality of Dauin, a 
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small town off the coast of Negros. Qualitative data from residents and local scientists 
depict decreased fish catches and deterioration of coral reefs during the early 1970s. In 
1976, Siliman University located on the mainland of Negros, initiated a marine 
conservation and education program at Apo Island. The concept of a no-take marine 
reserve was introduced to the residents of Apo. It was in 1982 that an informal agreement 
between Siliman University and the municipality of Dauin was established to protect a 
0.45 km long section of a no-take marine sanctuary in addition to the zoning of a 500 m 
offshore marine reserve. The agreement was legally formalized in 1985 by the Dauin 
Municipal Ordinance. In addition, the marine management committee fully consisting of 
Apo residents was given the responsibility to manage and maintain the reserve. Siliman 
University had been providing scientific information and advice for the management of 
the reserve. Although the concept of establishing an MPA was initially introduced by 
Siliman University located in the mainland, the facilitation and long-term management of 
the MPA originally started with local community participation in 1982 (Russ & Alcala, 
1999). Currently, Apo Island residents gain from MPA user-fee system and tourist 
revenue to support community development activities such as the partial high school 
accommodating freshmen and sophomores (Marten, 2008; Apo island resident, personal 
communication, June 2008).  
 The Apo Island case study displays the importance of initial and long-term 
community collaboration in managing MPAs. Moreover, Apo Island displays social 
mobilization of communities and the gain of long-term community support for MPA 
initiatives. It appears that initial community support at Apo was facilitated by Siliman 
University’s efforts in community organizing, incorporating Apo residents in decision 
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making, and the organizing of field trips to neighboring islands that displayed successful 
and failed MPAs. Long-term community support is achieved by the recognition and 
utilization of MPA benefits resulting in increased livelihood options. 
 The study of communities and community-based CRM approaches significantly 
contribute to human dimensions research in Philippine coastal management. Communities 
are the keys to understanding other social frameworks such as governments and 
institutions as well as attitudes and beliefs about MPA initiatives. Without incorporating 
community collaboration, long-term biological and social success will not be achieved. 
Governance, Institutions, and Networks 
 Governance is described by Juda (1999) below: 
The formal and informal arrangements, institutions, and mores which 
determine how resources or an environment are utilized; how problems 
and opportunities are evaluated and analyzed, what behavior is deemed 
acceptable or forbidden, and what rules and sanctions are applied to affect 
a pattern of resource and environmental use (p. 91). 
Juda’s definition of governance does not only include institutions, but links the role of 
stakeholder norms to behavioral use patterns for the resource as well as stakeholder 
support for regulations. In the context of CRM, our understanding of governance can help 
explain the role of community and municipality-based local governance, the formulation 
of coastal policies and initiatives, and governance models for implementing CRM. 
Various governance models, including community-based, co-management, and 
collaborative MPA Network management are utilized to manage MPAs and MPA 
Networks in the Philippines (Christie & White, 2007). These governance models represent 
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stakeholders from the community and municipal local government as well as the national 
government. 
As mentioned in the previous section of this literature review, community-based 
management would involve communities in the decision-making of MPA management 
initiatives. Furthermore, community-based management would involve a bottom-up 
approach wherein communities themselves would shape the direction of MPA 
management initiatives. As a result, local enforcement of MPA initiatives is more 
effective because of local community decision-making in MPA management. Bottom-up 
strategies are more responsive to local conditions well known by local and direct resource 
users (Christie & White, 2007).  
Co-management government initiatives are often the result of community-based 
management (Christie & White, 2007). Co-management involves the equal integration 
and influence of direct resource users and policy makers in joint decision-making 
(Christie & White, 2007; Christie and White, 1997; Nielson, Degnbol, Viswanathan, 
Ahmed, & Abdullah, 2004; Pomeroy & Riviera-Guieb, 2006; White et al., 1994). 
Moreover, the re-assertion of community’s authority on coastal resources that they are 
subsistent upon is part of the co-management framework (White & Christie, 2007). In the 
Philippines, this framework can include partnerships between the community and 
municipal local government as well as the national government agencies and the MPA 
Network. 
MPA Network management involves collaboration among community and 
municipality local governments spanning a region of several municipalities and MPAs. 
Moreover, national government agencies, such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
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Resources (BFAR), collaborate with the MPA Network. According to Christie and White 
(2007), it has become clear the small isolated MPAs will not be effective in achieving 
biological and social goals unless these MPAs are part of a larger management network 
that address common MPA issues such as the effective enforcement of coastal 
management policies.  An example of establishment of a socioecological MPA network in 
the Philippines is the Southeastern Cebu Coastal Resource Management Council 
(SCCRMC). According to White, Alino, and Menenses (2006), greater research and 
policy support are needed to bolster MPA networks because they are formulated from the 
perspectives of direct resource users and local government. Current practices of MPA 
Networks include coastal law enforcement, fisheries and habitat management, and the 
provision of sustainable livelihoods to member municipalities of the MPA network. These 
practices are enacted in common ordinances and initiatives supported by municipalities 
and MPA Networks. 
Limitations of coastal management governance models depend on the context and 
scale of management. For example, community-based management lacks outside financial 
and political support from municipal local government to sustain and collectively enforce 
MPAs. Other limitations of community-based management involve accounts of corruption 
among community local governments and fisher organizations, resulting in the turnover of 
management to the municipal local government (Fish warden chair, personal 
communication, June 2009). On the other hand, co-management and MPA Network 
governance models involve limitations of scaling up management and maintaining 
representative stakeholder concerns of different communities comprising several member 
municipalities of the MPA Network (Christie et al., 2009). Additionally, there is the 
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potential for top down management wherein the municipal local government takes 
complete control of managing the MPA(s) that neighbor several communities within the 
municipality. Additional limitations with the co-management framework is the possibility 
for the national government to implement the management objectives instead of the 
community residents who would normally undergo a democratic decision making process 
among the local management committee (Christie & White, 2007). The focus on the 
implementation and enforcement of MPA initiatives by the national government without 
the equal integration of community interests results in declining community support, 
mistrust, and weak enforcement of the MPAs.  Furthermore, the imbalance of power 
between the national government and the municipal local government potentially results 
in the unequal distribution of monetary funds generated from MPA user fee systems.  
These funds are consequently distributed to the national government instead of the 
communities that bear the direct responsibility of managing MPAs. Our previous example 
of Apo Island faced management challenges when the national government noticed the 
increased local and international attention on Apo’s coral reef recovery. The national 
government primarily situated in the Philippine capital of Manila, was also aware of the 
increased dive tourism revenues that the Apo community gained by establishing their 
community-based MPA. The national government declared Apo as a protected seascape 
under the National Integration Protected Areas System (NIPAS) that resulted in the 
control of a national body, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(DENR). The control of the national government resulted in the allocation of MPA user 
fees to sustain national government departments such as the DENR. The small community 
of Apo no longer had complete control of managing their MPA as they once did. 
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Solutions to this issue resulted in the creation of the Protected Area Management Board 
(PAMB) composed of representatives from national and local government and other 
community stakeholders. The PAMB is representative of a co-management approach 
wherein local and national stakeholders somewhat play an equal role in managing Apo’s 
MPA. 
The evolution of co-management and community-based approaches is highly 
influenced by the presence or absence of functional common property regimes (White & 
Christie, 2007).  Common property regimes are property rights under which the common 
pool resources are held (Feeny, Polotan, & Domingo, 1990). Common pool resources are 
those that exhibit subtractability (use that subtracts from what is left for other users) and 
difficulty of excludability (physical nature of the resource poses difficulties in excluding 
and demarcating access) (Tucker, 1999). This fundamental difference between common 
pool resources and common property regimes sheds light on the types of property 
regimes, including private property, common, and state governance directly influencing 
the use of common pool resources. Functional common property regimes can directly 
affect access and resource use. In the case of the Philippines, past colonial times have 
replaced traditional or native decentralized governance systems that efficiently governed 
the extraction of natural resources (Christie & White, 1997). MPAs in the Philippines 
serve as another tool to revive common property regimes that have been broken over time 
during colonial times (White & Christie, 2007). The management of MPAs is somewhat 
modeled after Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for sustaining common pool resource 
institutions. These principles are outlined below with a description as it pertains to CRM 
and MPA management (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for sustaining CPR institutions. 
Design Principle Description 
1. Clearly defined boundaries  
 
Depicts the boundaries of the CPR (e.g. 
MPA, municipal waters) and who has rights 
to withdraw resources 
 
2. Congruence between appropriation and 
provision of rules and local conditions 
 
The appropriation and provision of rules 
involves restricting quantity and type of 
resource units (e.g. fish catch), technology 
(e.g. type of gear), time (e.g. seasonal 
fishing), and money (e.g. funding for 
management). These rules must match the 
local conditions and scale of the area to 
attain functionality and legitimacy. 
 
3. Collective-choice arrangements.  
 
Stakeholders can participate in modifying 
the coastal management rules of their 
municipal waters and MPA. 
 
4. Monitoring  Monitors, who have a stake in managing 
the resources, are accountable for other 
stakeholder’s actions as well as their own. 
Fish wardens or Bantay Dagat officials are 
designated by the community and/or 
municipal local government to monitor and 
enforce the regulations 
 
5. Graduated sanctions  
 
Sanctions are clearly specified in local and 
national ordinances, particularly for 
commercial fishers that illegally fish within 
municipal waters. 
 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms Opportunities, such weekly meetings, are 
available to officials and stakeholders to 
manage conflicts, specifically between 
violators and fish warden officials 
 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
 
The rights of community residents to form 
their own institutions, such as fisher 
organizations, are not challenged by 
external government authorities. 
 
8. Nested enterprises  
 
Decision making, monitoring, enforcement, 
and governance activities are organized and 
nested within the levels of the community, 
municipality, and the MPA Network.  
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Ostrom’s principles, particularly conflict-resolution and management mechanisms are to 
be ideally exercised in small scale community-based and municipality-based MPAs in the 
Philippines. Research depicts that the dismantling of conflict resolutions and collective 
action mechanisms results in the ineffectiveness of MPAs and declining public support for 
CRM initiatives (Christie & White, 2007; Christie et al., 2003a; Christie, 2004; Crawford, 
& Goroscope, 2001; Mcay & Jentoft, 1996; Trist, 1999; Pollnac; Walley, 2004). The legal 
framework for operating on functional property regimes significantly contributes to the 
success of MPAs in the Philippines. 
Philippine fishery laws in the 1990s provided a mechanism for decentralizing 
government and re-establishing common functional property regimes for the communities 
and the local government (Christie & White, 2007). These laws include the 1991 Local 
Government Code and the 1998 Fisheries Code that allow municipal local governments 
units to manage their municipal waters to 7 km and 15 km offshore respectively (Russ & 
Alcala, 1999). This allowed municipalities to set up MPAs without the direct approval or 
assistance from the national government units such as the BFAR (Russ & Alcala, 1999). 
Moreover, these fisheries laws allowed municipalities to be responsible for implementing 
local ordinances and national administrative orders such as the 1980 BFAR Fisheries 
Administrative Order that declared national protection of sanctuaries. These decentralized 
laws have been effective in local enforcement and participatory decision making of MPA 
policies and initiatives, particularly for the Philippine situation of having more than 7,150 
islands (White & Christie, 2007). 
  According to White and Christie (2007), the decentralized government structure 
encoded in the Philippines Constitution, the 1991 Local government code, and the 1998 
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Fisheries Code strongly suggest the adoption of community-based and co-management 
institutional framework. Furthermore, the decentralized government structure provides the 
opportunities for NGOs to collaborate with the community and municipal local 
governments as well as national governments in facilitating CRM initiatives among the 
scales of the community, municipality, and MPA Network. 
The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as institutions has been 
essential in building MPA networks and capacity within municipal local governments. 
NGOs such as Coastal Conservation Education Foundation (CCEF) and World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) have been facilitating and strengthening the MPA networks throughout the 
country. Local and international educational institutions such as University of the 
Philippines and Siliman University have also been instrumental in providing ecological 
and social science information needed for decision making among municipal local 
governments representing an MPA Network. NGOs and educational institutions 
strengthen MPA Networks by funding and facilitating capacity-building workshops that 
enable the necessary communication among municipal local governments. This 
communication includes the sharing of concerns and issues occurring in the scales of the 
communities and municipalities. In a way, the dialogue and deliberation that occurs in 
these facilitated workshops serves as a communication bridge for stakeholders 
representing the community and municipality. Moreover, the communication in these 
facilitated workshops serves as a portal for conflict management crucial for effective 
governance of MPAs and municipal waters.  
Effective governance of MPAs and conflict management strategies cannot occur 
without the integration of stakeholder perceptions of coastal management policies and 
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initiatives. Stakeholder perceptions reflect societal values, attitudes and normative beliefs 
of coastal management. Consequently, these perceptions influence the acceptability and 
public support for policies enforced by the municipal local government. The next section 
reviews the research themes of stakeholder perceptions as it pertains to CRM. 
Stakeholder perceptions reflecting societal values, attitudes, and normative beliefs 
Stakeholder perceptions about MPAs and CRM are invariably linked to 
communities, governments, and institutions that play key roles in determining the social 
and ecological outcomes of MPA establishment in the Philippines. Despite this strong link 
to well-published themes of coastal resource management such as local governance, there 
are few studies that focus on the influence of stakeholder perceptions, particularly the 
effect of attitudes and normative beliefs in driving public support and social outcomes of 
MPA establishment and coastal management policies. The paucity of studies on 
stakeholder perceptions could be due the lack of applying social science methods that 
investigate, monitor, and measure social outcomes and stakeholder emotions and 
perceptions of MPAs and CRM policies (Christie, 2004). 
Oracion, Miller, and Christie (2005) believe that social outcomes of MPA 
establishment are related to the notion that MPAs are human impositions on nature and 
society. Furthermore, MPA purposes and objectives are driven by environmental ethics 
that essentially involves decisions that humans make regarding values that accumulate to 
people and fall along a spectrum (Oracion, Miller, & Christie, 2005; Hargrove, 1989). 
This spectrum includes environmental values that are classified as “instrumental” and 
“intrinsic.” Instrumental values focus on enhancements in the well-being of people at the 
expense of nature (e.g. the value of fish for food security in Philippine communities). 
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Intrinsic values include those that benefit humanity but with minimized impacts to nature 
(e.g. value of snorkeling). These differing individual environmental values held by diverse 
resource users reflect societal values and norms influencing stakeholder perceptions and 
support for CRM. 
Weinstein et al. (2007) believe that societal values drive the successful 
implementation of MPA and CRM initiatives. There is the need for a better understanding 
of social influences of environmental change and the mechanism of synchronizing human 
behavior with environmental and social priorities (Weinstein et al. 2007). Studies have 
shown that while political, economic and social systems comprise the human dimensions 
of coastal management, natural resource values originate only in the social system 
(Weinstein et al. 2007). In the Philippines, these natural resource values are manifested in 
fishing practices, local government ordinances, local support for MPA implementation, 
and behavioral responses to changing power regimes within communities. These natural 
resource values cannot be analyzed in isolation, but with integration of context scales that 
allows the analysis of differing outcomes desired by diverse resource users. 
The case study of the Twin Rocks MPA occurring within the municipality of 
Mabini, Philippines displays stakeholder conflict and stakeholder perceptions about 
perceived social and ecological outcomes resulting from MPA management (Oracion et 
al., 2005). Some of the current stakeholders were the fisher folk, boatmen transporting 
tourists, NGOs, and dive resort operators. The Municipality of Mabini established the 
community-based Twin Rocks MPA in the early 1990s (Christie, 2003). It is important to 
note that the emerging dive tourism industry lobbied for protection of Twin rocks prior to 
the establishment of the MPA. The dive tourism industry’s main motivation for the 
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protection of Twin rocks appeared to be the potential increase of fish and coral recovery 
essential for increasing dive tourism and incorporating aesthetic and intrinsic appreciation 
of marine resources sought by international and local divers (Oracion et al., 2005). Initial 
local support and participation for the Twin Rocks MPA initiatives were high since the 
inception of the community-based MPAs (Christie, 2003). However, the subsequent 
coercive enforcement of resort owners and dive shop operators generated mistrust among 
locals (Christie, 2003). Several studies displayed the dissatisfaction of fisher folk with the 
Twin Rock’s MPA management because of the lack of community control and ownership 
that fisher folk once had on managing their designated community-based MPA (Christie, 
2003; Oracion et al., 2005).  Perceptions from the dive tourism industry showed concerns 
that the MPA would not be effectively managed without proper enforcement. These 
differing perspectives led to stakeholder conflict and behaviors that influenced the social 
failure of the Twin Rocks MPA.  Fisher folk plotted to stop diving in the MPA while dive 
resort operators resorted to bribery that allowed diving or stopped illegal fishing in the 
sanctuary. According to Nazarea, Rhodes, Bontoyan & Flora (1998), the inter-stakeholder 
conflict is grounded in economic class distinctions that influences local negative and 
positive perceptions of environmental management observed in other Philippine contexts. 
Influential dive resort operators had the connections and monetary capacity to enforce 
their perspectives on how an MPA should be managed. This conflict between the 
community of fisher folk and dive resort operators appears to stem from negative local 
perceptions about changing power regimes associated with managing community based 
MPAs. Consequently, local perceptions affect support for MPA initiatives. 
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 Local perceptions also reveal local knowledge on the evolution of the social and 
ecological systems of a coastal area throughout a time period. Local knowledge has been 
particularly useful in filling in the gaps of social and ecological baseline data on MPAs. 
Webb, Maliao, and Siar (2004) used local user perceptions to evaluate the condition of 
fisheries and coral reefs prior to the establishment of the Sagay Marine Reserve (SMR), 
Philippines. Additionally, local user perceptions were used to evaluate perceived 
outcomes and benefits of the SMR in the recent past as well as expectations for the future. 
The study revealed that positive perceptions about MPA management were correlated 
with resource users from the mainland while negative perceptions were correlated with 
resource users from geographically isolated island villages within the marine reserve. 
Resource users from the mainland had other forms of livelihood and were not as reliant on 
fisheries as resource users from the island villages. This study displays that local 
perceptions also have the capacity to reveal geographical scales (e.g. distance to 
mainland) influencing public support for MPA and coastal management policies and 
initiatives. 
 Understanding public support for natural resource management policies can be 
explained by various socio-psychological theories. As illustrated by the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) and the cognitive hierarchy, attitudes and normative beliefs serve 
as the closest predictors to behavioral intention and public support for management 
actions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, Vaske & Donnelly, 1999). In the context of CRM, 
public support for MPAs is highly influenced by stakeholder attitudes and normative 
beliefs toward the policies and initiatives intended to sustain coastal resources. Attitudes 
reflect stakeholders’ evaluation of a certain policy or outcomes of a management scenario 
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while normative beliefs reveal personal and social standards/norms for behaving and 
reacting to coastal policies in a given manner. Personal norms are an individual’s 
standards and expectations that are modified through interaction (Schwartz, 1977); while 
social norms are standards shared by members of a social group or those societal 
standards that influence an individual’s behavior in a given situation (Vaske, Fedler, & 
Graefe, 1986). The TRA and the cognitive hierarchy allow us to understand public support 
for coastal management scenarios and outcomes through the in depth analysis of 
stakeholder norms and attitudes. Despite the utility of these social psychology theories, 
there are sparse accounts of applying these theories to CRM scenarios, particularly in the 
developing countries such as the Philippines. Ishizaki’s (2007) study utilized attitude-
behavior theories for analyzing predictors of public support for sea turtle conservation 
management strategies in the Ogasawara islands in Japan. As predicted by theory and past 
research, Ishizaki’s results revealed that attitudes and specific beliefs about management 
scenarios were predictors of public support for sea turtle conservation. 
 While social psychology theories provide us a framework for understanding 
factors that predict and influence public support, other disciplines such as socioeconomics 
provide us with other drivers that influence public support and acceptability for CRM 
policies. The next section explores the socioeconomic dimensions of MPAs and CRM. 
Socioeconomic dimensions of MPAs and CRM 
 Livelihood dependence and displacement, use patterns and access rights, and the 
distribution of costs and benefits associated with MPAs are socioeconomic factors that 
affect public support and compliance for CRM policies and initiatives. Livelihood 
dependence on coastal resources, particularly on fisheries, reflects a significant portion of 
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the socioeconomic scenario in the Philippines. Green, White, Flores, Carreon, & Sia 
(2003) state that fisheries provide a direct income to a total of 1.3 million small fishers 
and their families. The implementation of MPAs as no-take fishing areas potentially 
results in the displacement of fishers to fish in other areas, consequently affecting use 
patterns. Fishers may resort to fish in further areas that could affect access into fishing 
areas that is likely managed and used by other fishing communities.  
The quality and amount of coastal resources present in areas outside MPAs may 
have socioeconomic cost and benefit implications. While MPAs may provide the benefits 
of long term “spillover” effects of fisheries to surrounding fishing areas, short term costs 
for fishing communities are inevitably present. For example, fishers have to face the travel 
costs to fish in further areas outside the MPA that may not have the same quantity and 
quality of coastal resources present inside the MPA. Opportunity costs associated with lost 
catches as a consequence to MPA restrictions may also be faced by fishing communities 
(Charles & Wilson, 2009). Management and direct operating costs of MPAs are also 
incurred by local government and community management committees, particularly for 
community-based MPAs where funds primarily come from the community local 
government unit and NGOs. Some direct operating and management costs include the 
funding of fish wardens that regulate destructive and commercial fishing within the MPA 
and the surrounding municipal waters. As a whole, these management scenarios represent 
social and political costs to the coastal community and its corresponding local 
government. 
The distribution of these costs and benefits associated with MPAs is another 
important socioeconomic dimension of CRM. Different stakeholders within the 
 35 
community often experience different costs and benefits. For example, tourism operators 
generally benefit from the presence of the MPA by acquiring recreational diver and tourist 
revenues. Fishing communities also benefit from MPA presence by the increased fish 
yield to potentially surrounding fishing areas. As mentioned previously, fishers face 
various costs of not being able to harvest the increased fisheries within their MPA.  The 
question that lies is which stakeholder(s) bears the direct costs and incurs the most 
benefits of MPA establishment. The imbalance of costs and benefits can often lead to 
conflict occurring within a community. 
The aforementioned socioeconomic dimensions, including conflict, often influence 
a community’s perceptions and potentially a community’s public support toward MPAs 
and CRM initiatives and regulations. Previous studies show that public support and 
acceptance are necessary for MPAs to be successful in restoring, conserving, and 
sustainably managing coastal ecosystem functions, services, and goods (Christie, 2005; 
Charles & Wilson, 2009; Cinner et al., 2009; Walmsley & White, 2003). The overall 
purpose for analyzing linkages between socioeconomic factors and public support is to 
understand factors that lead to achievement of long-term success of MPAs and coastal 
management initiatives. 
Tying it all in: communities, governance, stakeholder perceptions, and socioeconomics 
  Coastal Resource Management (CRM) applies the framework of integrated 
coastal management and ecosystem based management to achieve biological and social 
goals in coastal areas. Common CRM tools include MPAs and more recently MPA 
Networks to empower communities and municipal local governments to sustainably 
regulate the use of coastal resources. In the Philippines, the majority of the MPAs are co-
managed by community or fisher organizations and the municipal local government, 
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thereby representing stakeholders from different communities and the local government in 
the decision making of MPA and CRM initiatives.   
  The study of communities and community-based approaches significantly 
contribute to the human dimension research themes of CRM. Community-based 
approaches include participatory strategies such as sharing of stakeholder knowledge and 
leadership development resulting in the empowerment and increase in social capital 
among community residents. In turn, these community residents enforce and voluntarily 
comply with CRM policies and initiatives. Many of these participatory or community-
based approaches are spearheaded by NGOs that serve as facilitators and mediators 
between the community and municipality.  
 The empowerment of communities and local governments has led to the co-
management approach between community organizations and municipal local 
governments to manage MPAs and municipal waters. Effective governance of municipal 
waters and MPAs requires support and collaboration from neighboring municipalities 
through the MPA Network. The MPA Network is a social network of local governments 
that collaboratively manage a network of MPAs spanning several municipal waters. 
Common CRM initiatives and goals of MPA Networks include fisheries and habitat 
management, coastal law enforcement, and supplemental livelihood for displaced fishers. 
These CRM goals lead to the formulation of a common set of policies enforced among 
several municipal waters. 
 Public support and acceptability for CRM policies are influenced by stakeholder 
perceptions, including attitudes and normative beliefs of MPAs and CRM. Moreover, the 
lack of acceptability for CRM policies potentially leads to inter-stakeholder conflict. We 
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must not forget the role of socioeconomic factors, such as livelihood displacement and 
incurred cost and benefits of MPAs, which in turn influence stakeholder conflict and 
public support for CRM initiatives and policies. Overall, socioeconomic indicators, 
stakeholder perceptions, local government institutions, and community-based approaches 
can influence stakeholder conflict in CRM scenarios and consequently the enforcement, 
voluntary compliance, and public support, for coastal policies and initiatives. 
 Potential strategies and solutions to address CRM conflicts associated with 
communities, local government, socioeconomics, and stakeholder perspectives of coastal 
management policies include conflict management mechanisms enacted through 
mediating institutions such as MPA Networks and NGOs. Other strategies include the 
provision of opportunities, such as community-based MPAs, that restore functional 
common property and power/management regimes within a specific community. Research 
themes in the human dimensions of natural resources offers tools such as social science 
monitoring that enable local governments and coastal managers to understand conflict and 
underlying stakeholder perceptions about CRM policies. These stakeholder perceptions, 
including attitudes and norms, co-evolve with changing power regimes associated with the 
management of MPAs and municipal waters. In addition to understanding stakeholder 
perceptions, social science monitoring allows managers and local governments to 
understand linkages between the socioeconomic and ecological drivers that influence the 
success and benefits of MPAs and CRM to communities. The paucity of publications 
incorporating stakeholder perceptions, specifically normative beliefs and attitudes, in 
social  science monitoring depict the profound need for future studies in this topic. 
Without incorporating normative beliefs and attitudes as part of social science monitoring, 
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our understanding of community dynamics, local governance, and socio-economic 
dimensions will be incomplete. Consequently, social goals and potentially ecological 
goals of MPA management will not be effectively met, resulting in short term 
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MANUSCRIPT I. NORMS, CONFLICT, AND ACCEPTABILITY OF COASTAL 






This manuscript examines the role of norms, sanctions, consensus, and conflict among 
fishers’ evaluations on the acceptability of Coastal Resource Management (CRM) policies 
in the municipalities of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan in Cebu, Philippines. Research 
questions include the following: (a) What are fishers’ norms concerning the acceptability of 
CRM policies? (b) How do fishers’ norms of CRM policies differ among coastal 
municipalities? (c) How much local consensus is present concerning the acceptability of 
CRM policies? (d) How does consensus for CRM policies differ among municipalities? 
CRM policies include regulations on Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), fish gear and 
methods, fisher registration, commercial fishing, enforcement, and sanctions for fishing 
violations. The manuscript applies the Potential for Conflict Index (PCI2) to explore the 
level of consensus for CRM policies. Onsite interviews (n = 505) in the three municipalities 
reveal norms showing greater acceptability for MPA policies and less acceptability for fish 
gear registration and fishing permits to non-residents. Statistical differences among fishers’ 
evaluations (F > 4.86, p < .02, eta < .427, in all cases) expose differing perceptions of the 
way CRM is implemented and enforced in each of the municipalities. In general, Oslob 
fishers had the most acceptance and consensus for CRM and sanctions for fishing violations 
while Samboan had the least acceptance and consensus. Fishers’ evaluations allow local 






Coastal Resource Management (CRM) has used a variety of frameworks, 
including Ecosystem Based Management (EBM), to manage coastal ecosystems. The 
goal of EBM is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy and resilient condition so that it can 
provide the services humans want and need (Mcleod, Lubchenco, Palumbi, & Rosenberg, 
2005). Common coastal management tools include Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) or 
no-take marine reserves where fishing access is restricted. MPAs are tools utilized under 
specific coastal management concentrations such as fisheries and habitat management, 
coastal law enforcement, and foreshore management (Eisma-Osorio, Amolo, Maypa, 
White, & Christie, 2009). 
In the last several years, academic literature has highlighted the importance of the 
human dimensions of MPAs and CRM (Christie, 2004; Pollnac et al., 2010; Pietri, 
Christie, Pollnac, Diaz, & Sabonsolin, 2009; NOAA, 2008; Pomeroy & Riviera-Guieb, 
R., 2006). This literature has stressed conflict, enforcement, and compliance as integral 
factors that influence the social success of MPAs and CRM (Fisheries and Agriculture 
Organization [FAO], 2007; Christie, 2004; Oracion, Miller, & Christie, 2005). Despite 
the emphasis on the human dimensions of CRM, there is the lack of literature 
emphasizing the role of norms, acceptability and consensus for CRM policies. The latter 
are essential components of CRM affecting conflict, compliance, and public support for 
coastal management policies. The success of MPAs and coastal management programs 
are highly influenced by community support for policies, norms,
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enforcement, and conflict resolution or management (Christie, Pollnac, Oracion, 
Sabonsolin, Diaz, & Pietri, 2009; Pollnac et al., 2010; FAO, 2007). 
The objective of this manuscript is to examine the role of norms, sanctions, 
consensus, and conflict among fishers’ evaluations of the acceptability of CRM scenarios 
and policies in the municipalities of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan in Southern Cebu, 
Philippines. Moreover, this manuscript investigates municipality differences in 
stakeholder norms and consensus for CRM policies. Municipality differences could 
reflect the unique CRM norms and management styles implemented by each 
municipality. 
Norms and Acceptability for CRM 
Norms are standards that individuals use for evaluating behavior, activities, 
environments, or management proposals as good or bad, better or worse (Vaske & 
Whittaker, 2004). In coastal management, norms can be standards used by resource users, 
including fishers, to evaluate CRM policies and initiatives. Understanding norms can 
help coastal managers and local governments comprehend public acceptability, support, 
and compliance for coastal policies and management proposals. 
Norms can also help explain individual standards and behavior (personal norms) 
as well as collective behavior (social norms) toward coastal management policies and 
proposals. Social norms are defined as standards shared by the members of a social group 
and personal norms are defined as an individual’s own expectations, learned from 
experience, and modified through interaction (Blake & Davis, 1964). Understanding the 
concept of personal and social norms can help explain individual and public acceptance 
and support for specific coastal management rules and initiatives. The concept of social 
51 
 
norms can also clarify how social groups (e.g., fishing cooperatives) can influence 
individual decisions and behavior to comply with CRM policies. 
Norms are also intimately tied to the concept of sanctions – punishment for 
people who break norms or rewards for compliance with norms. Norms that are widely 
shared by most members of society often become legal mandates complete with formal 
sanctions (e.g., fines) for noncompliance. Such norms are also likely to be internalized; 
viewed as being right, legitimate, and hence obligatory. In coastal management, factors 
that improve rule compliance include severity of sanctions, legitimacy of regulations, 
peer pressure, and participatory co-management processes (FAO, 2007; Honneland, 
2000; Kaplan, 1998 Kuperan & Suitenen, 1998). 
Norms are said to be emerging when there is less agreement about specific coastal 
management scenarios. Informal sanctions may be used to encourage acceptable behavior 
for emerging norms (Heywood, 1996). For example, sanctioning non-resident fishers for 
fishing within another municipality’s jurisdiction is an emerging norm because of the 
lack of local ordinances implicitly stating the latter as a violation. As a result, informal 
sanctions (i.e., verbal warnings) from fish wardens are used to discourage non-resident 
fishers from fishing in off-limit municipal waters. Understanding consensus for emerging 
norms and coastal management policies can help clarify resource-use conflicts in CRM 
scenarios. 
Consensus and the Potential for Conflict Index (PCI2) 
Although norms help to elucidate fishers’ evaluations of coastal management 
policies, they do not illustrate consensus for these evaluations in a manner that can be 
easily comprehended by managers and local governments. Standard deviations may show 
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consensus of normative beliefs for a given situation. However, communicating standard 
deviations and illustrating consensus to managers with little to no statistical training can 
be challenging.  The Potential for Conflict Index (PCI2) is a new statistic that displays 
consensus among stakeholders’ normative beliefs concerning certain management actions 
(Vaske, Beaman, Barreto, & Shelby, 2010). The PCI was developed to aid the 
understanding of human dimensions findings to natural resource management concerns 
(Manfredo, Vaske, & Teel, 2003; Vaske, Needham, Newman, Manfredo, & Petchenick, 
2006). The second generation of this statistic (PCI2) ranges from 0 to 1. A PCI2 of 1 
corresponds to a scenario with the least amount of consensus and the greatest potential 
for conflict. This occurs when responses are equally divided between the two extreme 
values on a response scale. A PCI2 of 0 illustrates a distribution with 100% at any one 
point on the response scale, suggesting complete consensus and no potential for conflict 
(Vaske et al., 2010). 
PCI2 results are displayed as bubble graphs reflecting the amount of consensus for 
a given management scenario. The size of the bubble depicts the magnitude of PCI2 and 
indicates the extent of potential conflict (or consensus) regarding the acceptability of a 
particular topic (i.e., degree of dispersion). A small bubble represents little potential for 
conflict (i.e., high consensus) and a larger bubble represents greater potential for conflict 
(i.e., less consensus). The center of the bubble represents the mean rating as plotted on 
the y–axis (i.e., central tendency). 
This manuscript applies the second generation of the Potential for Conflict Index 
(PCI2) (Vaske et al., 2010) to display consensus among fishers’ norms for coastal 
management policies. By using the PCI2, in combination with the concept of norms and 
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the CRM, this manuscript examines the role of norms, sanctions, consensus, and conflict 
among fishers’ evaluations of the acceptability of CRM scenarios and policies in three 
coastal municipalities (Oslob, Santander, and Samboan) of Southern Cebu, Philippines.  
The following research questions are posed: a) What are fishers’ norms concerning the 
acceptability of CRM policies and initiatives, including MPAs? b) How do fishers’ norms 
of CRM policies differ among coastal municipalities? c) How much local consensus is 
present concerning the acceptability of CRM policies? d) How does consensus for CRM 
policies differ among municipalities? 
Philippine Coastal Management Context 
Philippine fishery laws in the 1990s enable municipal Local Government Units 
(LGUs) to manage their 15-km municipal waters (Pomeroy, Pido, & Garces, 2009). The 
Local Government Code of 1991 provides municipalities the opportunity to co-manage 
their municipal waters with people’s organizations (POs) that represent fishers and the 
different barangays or coastal communities within the municipality. The institutional 
structure provided by Philippine Fishery laws lays out the groundwork for understanding 
the devolution of responsibilities within the LGUs. 
Although municipal LGUs enforce the same set of national coastal policies (e.g., 
Fisheries Code of 1998), the LGUs use different management styles to fit and adapt to the 
ecological, geographical, political and financial limitations and context of their 
municipality. For example, some municipalities cannot afford to provide full salaries for 
their fish wardens, resulting in limited coastal law enforcement operations. The 
differences in management styles consequently result in differences in what fishers 
perceive as acceptable behavior (i.e., norm) and policies concerning CRM. Moreover, 
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these differences could reflect compliance issues and conflicts attributed to norms and 
management styles occurring in each municipality. 
Research Site Descriptions 
The municipalities of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan are located on the southern 
tip of the province of Cebu, Philippines (Figure 4). Oslob has the greatest number of 
villages or barangays, MPAs, and registered fishers. This municipality also has the 
largest area of municipal waters and houses in the Sumilon Island Sanctuary, one of the 
earliest MPAs established in 1973. Santander borders the southernmost barangay of 
Oslob and is within close distance (approximately 3 km) to Sumilon, providing Santander 
residents with easy access to Oslob’s coastal waters. Santander and Samboan each have 
one MPA and neighbor the coastal waters of several municipalities within the larger 
island of Negros. Samboan’s municipal waters are part of the Tañon Strait, protected 
under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act. The NIPAS Act, 
however, may slightly contradict local ordinances and other national fishery laws (e.g., 
Local Government Code of 1991) that promote the decentralized government 
infrastructure in the Philippines (Christie, 2005). For example, the NIPAS act requires the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to manage protected 
seascapes such as the Tañon straight, potentially creating conflict between local 
government decisions and national government decisions about coastal management 
issues. The legitimacy and contradiction in these laws may influence the CRM norms and 
conflict in Samboan. 
Similarities among the three municipalities include a common membership with 
the Southeast Cebu Coastal Management Council (SCCRMC), a social network of eight 
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municipalities that collaborate on managing their MPAs and municipal waters. The 
SCCRMC can be referred to as an MPA Network council due to the collaborative 
management of a network of MPAs spanning the Cebu Straight fisheries ecosystem. 
Some examples of SCCRMC membership benefits involve a joint fish warden 
commission that patrols all the waters of member municipalities. SCCRMC membership 
benefits and collaboration have the potential to influence CRM norms, local government 
institutions, and management styles of member municipalities. 
 






Onsite surveys were administered to fishers through face-to-face interviews
1
 
conducted from June to August 2009 (response rate ≈ 95%). The total sample was 505, 
representing southern Cebu municipalities of Oslob (n = 279), Santander (n = 139), and 
Samboan (n = 87). An official list of registered fishers was obtained from the 
municipalities of Oslob (N = 1012) and Santander (N = 376). There was no official list 
for the municipality of Samboan. 
Surveys 
Surveys were translated from English to the local dialect of Cebuano (Appendix 
B). These surveys were pre-tested with locals and revised in Cebuano. Survey visuals 
were used to facilitate a respondent understanding of survey questions (Appendix C, 
Finchum, 2002). This included the use of thumbs up and thumbs down signs to indicate 
the acceptability
2
 of a given CRM scenario.  The visuals were associated with a 5-point 
scale of very acceptable, acceptable, unsure, unacceptable, and very unacceptable. 
Survey questions included respondents’ evaluations of national coastal policies 
and scenarios adopted by municipalities. Many of these policies included fish gear 
regulation, MPA fishing restrictions, and the prohibition of commercial fishers in 
jurisdictional municipal waters. CRM scenarios also included fish warden enforcement of 
                                                 
1
 The author and community members who had previous survey experience conducted the 
interviews. Majority of these community members were wives of fishermen, thereby reducing the 
possibility of social desirability where respondents provide answers that are perceived to be 
responses desired by the researcher. Several survey training workshops were administered to 
interviewers. To increase research validity, weekly participatory workshops about the survey 
process were conducted with interviewees.  
2
 In this CRM context, acceptability, agreement and support for a given situation are synonyms in 
the Cebuano dialect. 
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coastal policies, personal understanding of CRM policies, fish gear registration, trust for 
local government institutions, and increase of fish catch since MPA establishment. These 
scenarios represented context-specific issues of CRM related to concerns such as 
enforcement of coastal policies affecting coastal management success (Christie et al., 
2009). 
Variables Description 
Municipality (i.e., Oslob, Santander, Samboan) served as the independent 
variable. Dependent variables included CRM scenarios and policies such as: a) MPA 
regulations (e.g. restrictions on fishing) b) fish gear and method regulations c) fisher 
registration d) consideration of community in coastal management e) prohibition of 
commercial fishers in jurisdictional municipal waters f) fish warden enforcement of 
coastal policies g) personal understanding of CRM policies h) fisher registration i) trust 
for local government institutions j) increase of fish catch since MPA establishment and k) 
communication between fisher organizations and the municipal local government 
regarding MPA management. Other dependent variables included sanctions for CRM 
policy violations such as the practice of dynamite and cyanide fishing. All dependent 
variables are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
Analysis Strategy 
One-way Analysis of Variance and Tamhanes post hoc tests were used to 
compare the mean normative evaluations among fishers from the three municipalities. Eta 
() served as the effect size measure and was interpreted as .1 (minimal), .3 (typical), and 
.5 (substantial) relationship (Vaske, 2008). The PCI2 was used to compare the amount of 
consensus for CRM scenarios and sanctions for fishing violations among the three 
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municipalities. Statistical differences between the observed PCI2 values were calculated 
using the software available from  
http://welcome.warnercnr.colostate.edu/~jerryv. 
Results 
Norms and Acceptability of CRM policies and scenarios 
Fishers’ evaluations of CRM policies and scenarios highlighted the study’s first 
research question investigating fishers’ norms about the acceptability of CRM policies. In 
general, fishers’ mean evaluation scores (M > .32) indicated acceptability of CRM, 
including MPA management and fishery policies
3
 (Table 2). Fishers approved of CRM 
concerning the prohibition of fishing within their MPA (M =. 95). Fishers were least 
acceptable of fish gear registration (M = .15) and the allocation of fishing permits to non-
residents (M = .16). 
Fishers were most accepting of sanctions applied to dynamite fishing (M = 1.43), 
cyanide fishing (M = 1.40), and commercial fishing within jurisdictional municipal 
waters (M = 1.32) (Table 3). Sanctions applied to fish pot use (M = - 0.174) and 
unregistered fishers (M = 0.41) were the least acceptable to fishers. 
Municipality Differences 
 
The study’s second research question concerned municipality differences among 
fishers’ norms of CRM policies. Normative beliefs concerning the acceptability of CRM 
policies significantly differed among municipalities (F > 4.86, p < .002,  < .427, in all 
cases, Table 4). In general, fishers from Oslob were more accepting of CRM
                                                 
3
 Evaluations were measured on a response scale of 2 to -2, with 2 as very acceptable, 1 as 




Table 2. Normative beliefs about the acceptability of coastal resource management  
(CRM) scenarios 
CRM scenario x * 
Necessity of buoys to mark MPA  0.93 
Prohibition of fishing in MPA  0.95 
Zoning of fish pots  0.83 
Municipal government regulating MPAs  0.67 
Fisher organizations managing MPAs  0.50 
Allocating diver user fee revenues to community that manage MPAs  0.84 
Lack of communication between Fisher organizations and municipal 
government 0.35 
Community’s opinion considered in MPA management  0.71 
Allotment of fish warden stipends regardless of whether violators are caught  0.56 
Allotting violator fee revenues to fish wardens  0.40 
Trust for police in supporting fish wardens  0.45 
Preparedness of police for supporting fish wardens  0.62 
Fish gear regulations  0.48 
Fishing permits for non-residents  0.16 
Fish gear registration  0.15 
Municipal benefits for fisher registration 0.44 
Increase of fish since MPA establishment  0.32 
   1





Table 3. Normative beliefs about the acceptability of sanctions associated with coastal 
resource management (CRM)  
CRM scenario x * 
Unregistered boats  0.89 
Non-residents fishing in municipal waters  0.98 
Cyanide Fishing  1.40 
Unregistered fishers  0.41 
Commercial fishing in municipal waters  1.32 
Residents fishing in MPA no-take zone  1.01 
Larger fines for non-residents fishing in MPA no-take zone  1.22 
Use of fine mesh nets  0.56 
Compressor fishing  1.29 
Taking giant clams  0.61 
Off-season fishing for rabbit fish  0.64 
Use of surface gill net  0.76 
Dynamite fishing  1.43 
Muro ami fishing
2
   1.14 
Lack of building permits for foreshore structures (e.g. sea walls)  1.04 
Fishing with super lights  1.22 
Cutting of Mangroves  1.10 
Fish Pot Use  -0.17 
   1
Means refer to a respondent’s evaluation based on a response scale of 2 “highly acceptable” to -      
2 “highly unacceptable”. 
   
2
Muro ami fishing refers to the use of a drive in gill net and a scare line. Rocks attached to the 
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Allocating diver user fee revenues 
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 11.14 <.001 .209 
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) are significantly different from each 
other at the p<.05 level based on the Tamhanes post hoc analysis. 
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(p < .001,  <. 427). Santander fishers were most accepting of MPA restrictions on fishing 
and fish gear registration (M < 1.31, F > 4.30, p < .001,  < .338). Samboan significantly 
differed from the rest of the municipalities because it had the least acceptance for CRM 
policies and scenarios. This was evident in Samboan’s norms concerning the allocation of 
fishing permits to non-residents and the lack of communication between fisher 
organizations and the municipal government (M > -.58, F > 4.86, p < .001,  < .427). 
The patterns observed for CRM norms were similar for beliefs concerning the 
acceptance of sanctions applied to CRM policy violations and scenarios (Table 5). 
Samboan was the least accepting of sanctions (M > -.45) while Oslob generally had the 
most acceptance for sanctions applied to CRM policy violations (M < 1.5). For sanctions 
applied to resident fishing in no-take MPAs, Santander had the greatest acceptance (M = 
1.2), and significantly differed from the other two municipalities (F = 7.40, p = .001,  = 
.172). Most of the differences among municipalities were minimal ( < .221) with the 
exception of differences concerning sanctions applied to non-residents fishing in 
municipal waters ( = .340) and MPA no-take zones ( = .309). 
Consensus for CRM scenarios, policies and sanctions  
The PCI2 statistic illustrates our third research question investigating the amount 
of local consensus concerning the acceptability of CRM policies among the 
municipalities (Figure 5). In most cases, Oslob had the most consensus (PCI2 < .56) and 
Samboan had the least consensus for CRM policies and scenarios (PCI2 < .70) (Table 6). 
A comparison of CRM scenarios within each municipality revealed Oslob having the 










) are significantly different at the p<.05 
level based on the Tamhanes post hoc analysis. 
2
 Muro ami fishing refers to the use of a drive in gill net and a scare line. Rocks attached to the 
scare line are used to pound coral and drive fish into the gill net.  
Table 5. Municipality differences about the acceptability of sanctions for CRM scenarios 
 Municipality
1
    
 










 11.15 <.001 0.211 





















 3.10 .046 0.112 







 9.30 <.001 0.193 







 7.40 .001 0.172 
Larger fines for non-residents 






 25.21 <.001 0.309 







 11.31 .001 0.215 
Taking giant clams 0.66 0.63 0.44 1.05 .350 0.065 






 8.41 <.001 0.184 













 8.36 <.001 0.184 
Muro ami fishing
2
 1.12 1.27 1.00 1.55 .210 0.079 
Lack of building permits for 
foreshore structures 1.07 1.12 0.83 1.99 .140 0.091 






 4.280 .014 0.132 
Cutting of Mangroves 1.13 1.12 0.99 0.63 .530 0.052 
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) are significantly different from each other at   the 
p <.05 level based on the PCI2 Difference test. 
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Oslob had the most consensus for the belief that communication was lacking between the 
municipal local government and fisher organizations (PCI2 = .08). Similarly, Santander 
and Samboan had the most consensus for the latter scenario (PCI2 = .06; PCI2 = .23). 
Santander had the least consensus for allocating fishing permits to non-residents (PCI2 = 
.61). Lastly, Samboan had the least amount of consensus for the necessity of buoys to 
mark their MPA (PCI2 = .71).  
 The PCI2 difference test reflected municipality differences on the amount of 
consensus for CRM policies and scenarios, clarifying the study’s fourth research question 
(Table 6, Figure 5). In general, Samboan’s consensus for CRM was significantly less than 
the rest of the municipalities (PCI2 < .70). Cases where the three municipalities did not 
significantly differ included the allocation of violator fee revenues for supporting fish 
wardens (PCI2 < .39), the provision of fishing permits to non-residents (PCI2 < .61), and 
the increase of fish catch since MPA establishment (PCI2 < .32). All municipalities had 
the same amount of consensus for fish gear registration (PCI2 = 0.52). Santander had the 
most consensus for the prohibition of fishing within the MPA no-take zone (PCI2 < .20). 
Oslob had the most consensus for the consideration of the community’s opinion in MPA 
management (PCI2 = 0.12) as well the acquisition of municipal benefits for fisher 
registration (PCI2 = 0.21). 
Similar to previous results, Samboan had the least amount of consensus for 
sanctions applied to all CRM scenarios (PCI2 < .36) (Figure 6, Table 7). In particular, 
Samboan had the least amount of consensus for sanctioning non-resident fishing in 
municipal waters (PCI2 = .59) and the use of fine mesh nets (PCI2 = .63). Among the 
three municipalities, Santander had the least amount of consensus for sanctioning 
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unregistered fishers (PCI2 = 0.59), followed by Samboan (PCI2 = .56) and Oslob (PCI2 = 
.47) (Figure 6). Oslob and Samboan had the least consensus for sanctioning fish pot use 
(PCI2 = .52) and were significantly different from Santander (PCI2 = 0.41). Cases where 
municipalities did not significantly differ was the consensus on sanctioning non-resident 
fishing in municipal waters (PCI2 < .20), muro-ami
4
 fishing (PCI2 < .22), and the cutting 








                                                 
4
 Muro ami fishing refers to the use of a drive in gill net and a scare line. Rocks attached to the 
scare line are used to pound coral and drive fish into the gill net. Muro ami is prohibited by the 






Table 7. Potential for Conflict Indices (PCI2) displaying the amount of consensus for the 









































































































































) are significantly different from each other at 





 Fishers’ evaluations reflected acceptability of MPA policies. There was less 
acceptance and consensus for policies that involved regulating municipal waters outside 
of MPA borders. Some of these policies included fish gear registration and the provision 
of fishing permits to non-residents. These results have implications regarding norms and 
the acceptability of regulating fishing access outside MPAs. First, MPA policies are 
somewhat acceptable and supported by fishers from these municipalities, reflecting well-
enforced and established norms of small no-take MPAs. These results are comparable 
with Christie et al.’s (2009) research showing significant correlations between 
community support for MPAs and improved enforcement of MPA policies in Southern 
Cebu, Philippines. Second, regulating fishing effort (e.g., regulating fish gear and 
restricting access to non-resident fishers) beyond MPA boundaries are emerging norms 
that potentially create conflict among resource users and local government. This situation 
is reflected in the low acceptability and consensus for fish gear registration and fishing 
permits to non-residents. Implications for these results indicate early institutional 
attempts to implement Ecosystem Based Management (EBM), where fisheries 
management spans beyond MPAs and includes regulating a network of jurisdictional 
waters of a region (Eisma-Osorio et al., 2009; Christie et al., 2009). These management 
attempts help establish norms concerning fishing effort and access within municipal 
waters. 
The legitimacy of norms and sanctions are crucial for sustaining acceptability and 
compliance for coastal management policies (Christie et al., 2009). Sanctions for 
destructive fishing practices, such as dynamite and cyanide fishing, were the most 
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acceptable for fishers. These results imply that sanctioning destructive fishing practices is 
a well-enforced and established norm for these municipalities. The results are contrary to 
situations in Cebu (e.g., Olango Island) where dynamite fishing occurs due to weak law 
enforcement (Armada et al., 2009; Green et al., 2004).  
Enforcing sanctions for potentially destructive fishing practices such as fish pot
5
 
use were the least acceptable among fishers. Oslob had low acceptability and consensus 
for sanctioning fish pot use because of the large number of fishers that use fish pots. 
Implications for sanctioning fish pot use will likely create conflict among fishers due to 
low acceptability, consensus, and national legislation (e.g., Fisheries Code of 1998) 
currently legalizing its use. Municipality differences on fishers’ acceptability and 
consensus for CRM policies imply various management styles and localized norms for 
enforcing national fishery laws. These management styles along with CRM government 
institutions may affect fishers’ perception, acceptability, and consensus for CRM 
policies. For example, Samboan permits some commercial fishing to occur within their 
jurisdiction, despite that it is illegal for neighboring municipalities. This situation reflects 
Samboan’s low acceptability and consensus for providing fishing permits to non-
residents (often commercial fishers) from nearby municipalities and islands. On the other 
hand, Oslob had the most acceptability and consensus for CRM likely due to well-
established and consistently enforced policies by government staff and fish wardens.  
All municipalities did not differ in their amount of consensus (PCI2 values) for 
their belief that fish catch had increased since MPA establishment. However, the average 
                                                 
5
 Fish pots can be destructive when they are dragged along the reef bottom and destruct coral reef 
habitat. The current can lose fish pots that serve as “ghost nets”, trapping unconsumed fish. 
Despite its destructive potential, it is difficult to regulate fish pot use due to its legal designation 
as passive fish gear permitted within municipal waters 
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level of agreement (i.e., mean evaluation scores) did significantly differ among 
municipalities. Santander and Oslob were unsure whether their fish catch had increased 
while Samboan fishers felt that their fish catch had not increased since the establishment 
of their MPA. These perceptions and normative beliefs are crucial for influencing 
compliance and community support for MPAs and CRM policies. Previous studies done 
within the municipalities showed that fishers’ perceptions of increased fish catch since 
MPA establishment are significantly correlated to community support for MPAs (Christie 
et al., 2009) and coastal management success (Lowry et al., 2009).  
Understanding norms and consensus for CRM scenarios enables managers and 
local government institutions to better manage conflict and garner public support and 
compliance for coastal policies. Conflict is not only influenced by consensus for such 
policies, but norms concerning the legitimacy, enforcement, and sanctions associated 
with CRM policies. Context-specific CRM scenarios reflect norms that guide managers 
to focus on policies and proposals salient to fishers. The identification of these salient 
policies is crucial for attaining public support and compliance. For example, identifying 
salient proposals such as regulating fishing effort and access outside MPAs for non-
resident artisanal fishers would be the first step for managers to understand public 
support and compliance. Once salient proposals are identified, a focus on context-specific 
scenarios can guide managers to further understand public support and compliance for 
such policies. Context-specific scenarios could include fishers’ low support for regulating 
fishing access due to ecological processes such as ocean current dispersing neighboring 
non-resident fishers to off-limit municipal waters, and consequently getting sanctioned by 
fish wardens. Management recommendations could include permitting non-resident 
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fishers from barangays/villages bordering a municipality to fish within the municipality’s 
jurisdiction. This management action would be feasible through boat registration 
identifying fishers residing from specific villages of a municipality. The SCCRMC has 
discussed the proposal of permitting fishers from all member municipalities to fish within 
jurisdictional waters of the SCCRMC encompassing the Cebu Strait fisheries ecosystem 
(Eisma-Osorio et. al, 2009). However, this proposal has not been undertaken due to lack 
of consensus for some municipalities.  
Theoretical Implications: Norm Influence on Stakeholder Consensus and Behavior in 
CRM 
Consensus and acceptability for coastal management proposals and policies is 
linked with the concept of norms concerning management styles and socio-political 
contexts of a municipality. Furthermore, understanding the concept of norms and how it 
has been used by social psychologists can advance our understanding on the influence of 
norms on consensus and behavior toward management proposals and policies (see Vaske 
& Whittaker 2004 for a review). Some social psychologists concentrate on the variables 
that serve to focus or activate a norm, while others address how social pressure can 
influence behavior or aid in the diffusion of ideas (e.g., coastal educational programs 
diffused through social groups) (Pietri et al, 2009). Norm theories also differ in how they 
measure the concept of norms. Norm focus / activation theories measure norms at the 
individual level (i.e., personal norms) and then aggregate the data to derive social norms. 
The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), in contrast, focuses primarily on 
perceived social norms (i.e., subjective norms). Under this paradigm, subjective norms 
refer to what you think others would want you to do. The concept of subjective norms 
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can clarify the influence of social groups on conflict and acceptance for specific coastal 
management proposals. Further studies on the influence of subjective norms and social 
norms on stakeholder behavior for CRM policies and initiatives can also increase our 
understanding of conflict, consensus, and public support for coastal management 
proposals and initiatives. 
Future Research and Limitations 
Future research can include investigating emerging norms, such as the regulation 
of fishing effort and access in municipalities in Cebu, Philippines. The focus on a few 
salient policies (e.g., regulating the number of fishers that can enter municipal waters) 
enables local governments and managers to understand and narrow down specific factors 
affecting policy compliance. An avenue for future research could include investigating 
the relationship of regulating fishing effort with consensus and community support for 
EBM proposals. These studies could benefit collaborative local government groups such 
as the SCCRMC, which are moving toward EBM policies and initiatives in Southeastern 
Cebu (Eisma-Osorio et al, 2009)  
Limitations of this study involve a sample representing fishers, one of the main 
stakeholders affected by CRM implementation at the different communities. While much 
of the literature has focused on stakeholders representing local governments (i.e., 
barangay or village captains), more studies are needed to represent different stakeholders 
from the communities (e.g., artisanal fishers, tourist operators and fish vendors) that do 
not participate in managing municipal waters, but are mandated to comply with CRM 
policies. Perspectives of stakeholders from the municipality and the communities enable 
a better representation of norms, conflicts, and support for CRM policies. 
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Further studies could also include investigating factors, such as political will, 
institutional strength, and legitimacy of policies that influence public support, consensus 
and conflict about a given CRM scenario. Studies are also needed on the influence of 
sanctions and incentives for compliance and support for coastal management policies. 
These studies could enable local governments and managers to better evaluate CRM 
policies and educational programs that utilize incentives (e.g., search and rescue benefits 
for registered fishers) intended to influence fisher behavior and compliance for such 
policies.  
The applicability and use of the PCI2 to influence local government decisions in 
coastal management should be further investigated. This paper presented PCI2 findings to 
SCCRMC and the municipal local governments of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan. In 
general, local government officials understood PCI2, predicted some of the PCI2 results 
for their municipality, and were receptive to discussing implications of PCI2 values to 
municipal coastal management programs. Future studies could entail management actions 
taken to address conflicts displayed by PCI2. A mixed methods study incorporating 
quantitative and qualitative methods (e.g., in depth interviews), would be more 
appropriate to investigate local government responses and management actions based on 
PCI2 values of specific municipalities. These future studies could help governmental and 
non-governmental institutions make well informed management decisions that support 
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MANUSCRIPT II. DIVING UNDER THE SURFACE: INVESTIGATING 







 Coastal issues in the Philippines reflect global trends where mass habitat 
destruction compromise livelihoods and food security. A major piece of managing such 
issues requires understanding the role of institutional accountability in coastal resource 
management (CRM) at the local government. This investigation explores institutional 
conflict and accountability within a coastal municipality in Cebu, Philippines. 
Specifically, using in-depth interviews, I explore stakeholder perceptions of 
common CRM issues, including institutional accountability for CRM. Second, I 
investigate the institutional relationships among stakeholders who are accountable for 
CRM. Lastly, I examine how these institutional relationships and stakeholder perceptions 
affect the overall outcome of CRM at the community, municipality, and the MPA 
Network scales. My interpretive analysis reveals that conflicts concerning institutional 
accountability for CRM are often at the root of problems of implementing and enforcing 





 The coastal situation in the Philippines reflects global trends where unsustainable 
use of coastal resources results in mass habitat destruction, pollution, and significant 
threats to food security. Coastal Resource Management (CRM) addresses these coastal 
issues with a variety of tools and evolving frameworks including Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs), Integrated Coastal Management (ICM), and more recently Ecosystem Based 
Management (EBM) (Pomeroy et al., 2009). These frameworks have common goals of 
sustaining coastal ecosystem function by achieving the balance of environmental and 
socioeconomic goals (Christie et al., 2009). As a result of integrating CRM frameworks, 
fishery laws in the 1990s enable the Department of Agriculture - Bureau of Fisheries and 
Aquatic Resources (DA-BFAR) and the municipal Local Government Units (LGUs) to 
manage coastal waters (Pomeroy et al., 2009). The Local Government Code of 1991 
provides LGUs the opportunity to co-manage the municipal waters with people’s 
organizations (POs) that represent the communities within the municipality. The 
Fisheries Code of 1998 mandates the creation of Fisheries and Aquatic Management 
Councils (FARMC) at the community, municipal, and national level. The FARMC at the 
municipal level is composed of the Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO), Municipal 
Planning and Development Council Officer (MPDC), a representative of Department of 
Agriculture (DA), Fish Warden Organization, chairperson of the Fishery committee of 
the Municipal Council, fisher folk representatives, and NGOs (DA-BFAR, 1998). The 
FARMC at the community level consists of community leaders, fish folk association
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and community residents. 
The institutional structure provided by Philippine Fishery laws lays out the 
groundwork for understanding the devolution of responsibilities and duties of committees 
within the LGU. In general, it is the Municipal Council (SB) that enacts local ordinances, 
the fish wardens who enforce those ordinances and the MFARMC and the MAO that 
head CRM and coastal law enforcement (CLE). As a consequence of this institutional 
structure, conflicts attributed to coastal resource management are supposedly 
collaboratively addressed among responsible committees and officers such as the 
municipal FARMC (MFARMC), Fish Warden Commission (FWC), and the MAO. These 
parties along with the municipal mayor form and enact a CRM plan that is intended to be 
co-managed with the different communities of the municipality. 
 The CRM committees within the LGU attain support from the Marine Protected 
Area (MPA) Network, a social network consisting of representatives from seven LGUs 
that share common goals of collaboratively managing the region’s municipal waters, 
including 21 MPAs sites. Some of these management goals include coastal law 
enforcement, foreshore management and fisheries and habitat management. Current 
efforts to achieve these goals include adopting a common policy framework, monthly 
collaborative meetings and training workshops supported by local NGOs. 
  Despite the support that local governments receive from the MPA Network and 
the legal mandate for the institutional structure for CRM, it is unclear exactly how CRM 
issues are addressed by the accountable CRM committee members within the 
municipality. The seemingly obscure enactment of CRM issues leads to three main 
research questions: 1) What are stakeholder perceptions of institutional accountability for 
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CRM? 2) What are the institutional relationships among stakeholders who are 
accountable for CRM? 3) How do these thee stakeholder perceptions impact CRM at the 
community, municipality, and the MPA Network scales? To address these questions, I 
present an in-depth case study of a coastal municipality in Cebu, Philippines. I conducted 
23 in-depth interviews revealing several perspectives of institutional accountability and 
interpersonal conflict among the various CRM stakeholder groups. In this context, 
institutional accountability involves answerability, wherein public officials are obligated 
to explain and understand their roles in CRM, as well as enforcement in which 
institutions enforce appropriate sanctions to CRM violators (Shedler, 1999). The analysis 
of institutional accountability through in-depth interviews provides a deeper 
understanding of underlying challenges in implementing and enforcing CRM initiatives 
within the municipality. Furthermore, the analysis of institutional conflicts provides a 
more transparent picture of the cascade of consequences experienced by the community 
members who are directly affected by the enforced coastal resource management 
regulations and initiatives. 
Case Study Context  
 This coastal municipality consists of six coastal communities and four mountainous 
communities with a growing population of more than 15,000 residents with over 10,000 
residents living on the coast (Municipal CRM Plan, 2005). The municipality is less than 
10 km from neighboring islands, which lends itself to unique socio-ecological 
implications that affect adjacent municipalities.  This location includes an abundance of 
fisheries that attract recreational divers and dive resort operators as well as commercial 
fishers who illegally fish within municipal waters. The LGU and fish wardens have the 
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challenge of managing and controlling municipal waters that abut the neighboring 
jurisdictional waters of three additional municipalities. 
  In order for the municipal local government to tackle their coastal challenges, the 
active involvement and collaboration of MFARMC members, including the MPDC, fish 
wardens, and most importantly the MAO as a representative to the DA is crucial. Typical 
CRM plans in the region state that the MAO oversees the entire operations of the CRM 
team for implementing CRM activities (Samboan CRM Plan, 2002). In fact, the 
municipality's CRM plan specifically states that the MAO “ensures assistance and access 
to resources in the production, processing and marketing of marine products to fishers 
and entrepreneurs; conducts continuing studies, research, and training programs for 
stakeholders’ capability strengthening” (Municipal CRM plan, 2002, p. 47). Other 
regions in the Philippines state that the MAO is responsible for the implementation of 
fishery projects in the municipality (Campos, 2009). Based on the mandate provided by 
the Philippines Fishery Law of 1998, the MAO is a key player in the MFARMC team to 
address CRM issues within the municipality. Figure 7, taken from the Municipality's 
CRM plan, show the MAO’s position along with other members of the LGU. While there 
are many players within the LGU for CRM, the visual connection of the MAO to the 
communities (as shown by the dotted lines in Figure 7) represent the duty of the MAO to 
facilitate the co-management approach between the communities and the LGU. In fact, 
all of the local CRM ordinances in this community include the MAO as the one of the 
key people who “takes the lead for implementing the ordinance” (Municipal Office of the 




Figure 7. Institutional Structure for Coastal Resource Management at the Municipality  
 Where do the fish wardens fit into the institutional structure? Fish wardens are 
certainly not part of the LGU, but they work closely with the LGU and NGOs as 
enforcers of CRM ordinances. Furthermore, fish wardens serve as community consultants 
to the mayor as well as the MFARMC.  Like many community or people’s organizations 
(PO) in the Philippines, the Fish Warden Commission (FWC) started as a volunteer 
organization to patrol municipal waters and MPAs for illegal fishers, including 
commercial fishers. The FWC has been strengthened over the last several years by the 
local NGO that provides technical training on apprehension of illegal fishers. The 
implementation of a dive user fee has provided the municipality with funds to support six 
fish wardens with a monthly honorarium of about US $30. The small honorarium is for 
the 24–hour patrol of municipal waters, the apprehension of illegal fishers, dive user fee 
collection, court appearances, and the writing of police reports for the Philippine National 
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Police (PNP). In an interview, an NGO representative confirmed that fish wardens often 
risk their lives and bear the burden of responsibility when they patrol municipal waters in 
their small outrigger boats and apprehend commercial fishers. 
Methods 
 This research is part of a larger study focused on analyzing stakeholder 
perspectives of coastal resource management (CRM) policies at the levels of the 
community, municipality, and the MPA Network. The larger study included structured 
survey interviews at the community level, participant observation of workshops at the 
municipal level, and semi-structured interviews at the community, municipal, and MPA 
network level. Structured surveys and semi-structured interviews focused on specific 
CRM policies and initiatives pertaining to a priori categories of fish gear and method 
regulations, zoning within MPAs, allocation of funds, sanctions for fishing violations, 
community-based management, education awareness programs, and livelihood programs.  
The preliminary analysis of tape-recorded semi-structured interviews occurred 
when I clarified and expanded on the main points of interviews documented in my field 
notes, a process called note expansion (Mahoney, 1997).  As I further analyzed my 
interviews, patterns and themes of institutional conflict and accountability emerged, 
specifically for the municipality of this case study. Thus, this study is a focused 
exploration of these themes through in-depth interviews and participant observation of 
meetings with key informants of the municipality.  
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 I obtained permission from my interviewees to display results for research 
purposes. To ensure the anonymity of interviewees, no names were used. Some 
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pseudonyms, such as the Fish Warden Commission (FWC) and the MPA Network were 
used in this manuscript. Furthermore, the municipality is not mentioned, making 
it difficult for Cebuano residents and Philippine coastal managers to determine the 
municipality and the exact local government identities in Cebu. The identity of the NGO 
in this municipality was also kept anonymous. There are other NGOs in this municipality, 
making it challenging to determine which NGO was directly involved with issues 
presented in this manuscript.   
Data Collection 
 I conducted a total of 23 in-depth and semi-structured interviews, with eleven 
community members, seven municipality representatives, two MPA Network members, 
and three NGO representatives.  I conducted these interviews to gain a better 
understanding of the perspectives of stakeholders representing the community, 
municipality, and the MPA Network (Table 8). Stakeholders from the community 
primarily involved the fish warden leader, fish warden members, artisanal and 
commercial fishers, barangay or village captains, and women of the community. 
Interviewees from the municipality encompassed the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, fish warden 
consultant/mediator, director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) headquarters at the 
municipality, and members of the MFARMC (Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources Management Council). MFARMC members included the Municipal 
Agricultural Officer (MAO), fishery technician and the Municipal Provincial 
Development Coordinator (MPDC). Key informants from the MPA Network included the 
president of the CRM council as well as the MPA Network’s secretariat representing the 
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said municipality. Lastly, interviewees at the NGO level included community organizers, 
facilitators, and the manager of the local governance project of the NGO. 
Table 8. Key informants interviewed at different level/scales 
 
Level Key Informants/Stakeholders 
Community Fish Warden Leader 
 Fish Wardens 
 Artisanal Fishers 
 Commercial Fishers 
 Barangay/ Community Captains 




 Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) 
 fishery technician  
 Municipal Planning and Development 
Council Officer (MPDC) 
  
  
MPA Network Chairman of the Coastal Resource 
Management Council 
 Secretariat at the said municipality 
  
NGO NGO representative living at the said 
municipality 
 Community organizers 
 Facilitators 
 Project Manager  
 
I observed five meetings and workshops held among MPA Network members. 
The length of time for both in-depth and semi-structured interviews ranged from 20 
minutes to a maximum of two and a half hours. Meetings and workshops held at the 
MPA Network and municipality from one-day meetings to three-day workshops. To get a 
more in-depth understanding of the context of the municipality, I also obtained 
meeting/workshop minutes, coastal resource management planning documents such as 
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the municipal five-year CRM plan, and public records on coastal law enforcement issues 
within the municipality. 
I interviewed stakeholders in their native language of Cebuano. The interview 
transcription process first involved transcribing interviews in Visayan and afterward 
translating the transcripts to English. I transcribed over 54 hours of interviews resulting in 
approximately 274 pages of transcripts. Furthermore, I used a research journal and note 
expansion to supplement the transcription process, particularly for those interviews that 
occurred with key informants such as the fish warden leader and the MAO. 
Analysis 
 I used the Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) process to analyze 
content of the interviews, public documents, and workshops. IPA is concerned with lived 
experiences, how that person perceives the experience, and the researchers’ interpretation 
of the person’s lived experience (Smith & Osborn, 2000). I applied the IPA process by 
living in one of the small communities within the municipality, specifically in the fish 
warden leaders’ home for approximately three months from mid-May to early August of 
2009. This personal experience enabled me to have access to create connections with the 
community and the local government of the municipality. Furthermore, this experience 
enabled me to observe typical events of CRM and coastal law enforcement (CLE) within 
the community (e.g. listening to fish wardens talk about their day of patrolling municipal 
waters). Previous experience with the CCE and MPA Network members since 2004 also 
provided the crucial relations of trust for stakeholders to share their lived experiences and 
perception of CRM and CLE with the researchers. 
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 As mentioned previously, I used specific a priori categories of interview questions 
that were part of larger study aimed at understanding stakeholder perceptions of CRM 
and CLE policies and initiatives. Initially, I did not intend to focus on and understand 
institutional conflict and accountability within the municipality. However, through the 
process of note expansion and the coding of transcribed interviews, the themes of 
institutional conflict and accountability emerged through all of the interviews within one 
municipality. After themes of institutional conflict and accountability emerged through 
verbatim statements of interviewees, I verified these themes with key informants, 
specifically with key informants such as the fish warden leader, the MAO, and NGO 
representative who had been living and collaborating in the community for several years. 
 Methods for analyzing interviews, public documents, and workshops involved 
conflict mapping or situation mapping (Fisher et al., 2005; Daniels & Walker, 2001). 
Daniels and Walker (2001) define conflict mapping as the process of visually 
representing a situation in order to create a systemic understanding of the relationships 
among stakeholders. Based on the insights of each individual stakeholder, I symbolized 
weak, strong, and conflicting relationships of stakeholders with one another through 
different arrows. This process was repeated for each stakeholder mentioned in other 
interviews to get a more representative picture of the participants’ perceptions and lived 
experiences of institutional conflict and accountability. Through the conflict mapping 
process, I analyzed the relationships or lack thereof among stakeholders within the 
community, municipality, and the MPA network levels. I also used the conflict mapping 
process to further understand and link stakeholder relationships with the overall issue of 
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institutional accountability, organization, and processes affecting different stakeholder 
groups.  
Participatory processes and the verification of conflict maps 
 Upon completion of the conflict maps, I personally presented and verified these 
maps with key informants, including the fish warden leader and MPDC in June, 2010. I 
asked the key informants for any changes that they would like to see displayed in the 
conflict maps. In general, the key informants agreed with my interpretations of these 
maps and requested a few changes to the strength of arrows among fish wardens and the 
municipal council displayed in the maps. I incorporated these changes to the conflict 
maps based upon the requests of the key informants. 
Results and Discussion 
 I will discuss stakeholder perceptions of institutional accountability and conflict 
regarding coastal management issues at three scales: the community, municipality, and 
MPA Network scale.  I use a progression of conflict maps to reveal stakeholder 
relationships and associated perceptions of CRM within and across multiple scales 
(Figures 8, 9, 10, & 11). The increasing complexity of the conflict maps illustrates my 
research questions: 1) What are stakeholder perceptions of institutional accountability for 
CRM? 2) What are the institutional relationships among stakeholders who are 
accountable for CRM? 3) How do these stakeholder perceptions and relationships impact 
CRM at the community, municipality, and the MPA Network scales? 
Stakeholder Perceptions  
Key members of the MFARMC team, including the MAO, MPDC, and the fishery 
technician, report conflicting perceptions of institutional accountability of CRM within 
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the municipality. The DA-BFAR has been the lead organization, responsible for 
implementing the Fisheries Code of 1998 and provides the institutional structure to the 
local government through the creation of the MFARMC with the MAO and fishery 
technician as key players and collaborators of DA. Despite this institutional structure, the 
MAO does not believe that she should be held accountable for CRM initiatives within the 
municipality: 
Look what my job title says, Municipal Agricultural Officer, there is no 
fisheries included in my job title, nothing about fisheries… they [DA-
BFAR] just added on the responsibility for the MAO to take care of 
fisheries…. That’s why I have assigned a fishery technician  
The fishery technician, working directly for the MAO, consequently does not consider 
CRM and CLE as her top priority.  The fishery technician explained: “It’s not like I only 
have to take care of CRM and CLE activities. I have to deal with all the agricultural 
issues as required by my boss [MAO].”   
The MPDC, who is an active member of the MPA Network, has openly 
acknowledged the issue of institutional organization and accountability for implementing 
CRM in the municipality: 
There is a lack of organizational structure in CRM. It is only the 
organizational structure that we lack [in our municipality]. With regards to 
coastal management, it is the DA who should be appropriated for the job. We 
do not have someone in charge to deal with CRM. The MAO is in charge, 
and this is a problem. The technical knowhow [of the DA and MAO] is also 
problem, especially with the procurement of equipment [for CRM 
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initiatives]… there is also a problem with finding a main person to give first 
hand decisions to the fish warden commission. Our problem is our 
municipality’s DA. Sometimes, when the NGO gives technical workshops for 
the local government on coastal resource management, the DA [MAO] does 
not attend. Usually, it’s me that is brought to attend these workshops… that’s 
the problem and it’s actually their [MAO and fishery technician] 
responsibility to attend. 
The NGO that has mobilized local governments to sustain CRM programs in the 
municipality for the past decade also recognized the issue of institutional accountability. 
The NGO representative of the municipality acknowledged the lack of the MAO’s 
leadership and cooperation necessary for directing CRM programs in the municipality. 
 Sentiments regarding issues of institutional accountability within the MFARMC 
team are felt strongly by the Fisher Warden Association (FWA), particularly with the fish 
warden’s interactions with the MAO and fishery technician. The leader of the fish 
wardens explained that both the MAO and the fishery technician have told him: “Hey, 
you should be grateful that I am helping you do your job with CRM programs!” Similar 
to the sentiments of the MPDC and the NGO, the fish wardens feel that the MAO’s and 
fishery technician’s denial of their CRM duties has led to institutional disorganization 
and the uneven burden of CMR responsibilities. These sentiments are evident by the fish 
warden leader statements: 
I should be grateful? …. and what is the title with my position within the 
local government?... a laborer!… what do I get paid?… a monthly salary of 
US $40 for leading the fish warden commission…. and I have to be the 
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frontline on all the court cases? [Cases related to apprehension of CRM 
ordinance violators] But who has to take the risk? Is it them? The number of 
cases will drive you crazy... when someone is to be apprehended, I have to go 
out of my way with my motorcycle to town and to the police office to write a 
report. Is the MAO there? Is the fishery technician there? … I face all the 
apprehension issues, cases, attend the meetings that the MAO doesn’t attend, 
give the MAO handouts and my notes for the workshops that she was 
supposed to attend, face court issues, and give dive user fee reports. I have to 
tell you my story, the [CRM and CLE] problems of the municipality are 
added upon my fish wardens…and I have to face all the blame [as a fish 
warden leader]…And she [MAO] says we should be grateful?!!!...She, 
herself violated the local CRM ordinance by building her deck over the ocean 
and blocking public beach access! 
 The attitude and behavior of the MAO and fishery technician toward coastal 
management initiatives lead to the question of the legitimacy of the CRM leadership 
within the municipality. The fish wardens who network with other fish wardens from 
neighboring municipalities communicate and compare the direction and leadership that 
they obtain from their MAO. The active participation of the MAO in the neighboring 
municipalities as well as the 1998 Fishery Law that clearly states the importance of the 
MAO in CRM provides grounds for the fish wardens, the MPDC, NGOs, and the rest of 
the local government to question the legitimacy of the MAO and fishery technician. 
Interviews with the fish warden leader indicate that the only factor missing in the 
municipality is the leadership and accountability from the MAO and the fishery 
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technician. As mentioned earlier, the MPDC also emphasized the need for accountability 
and organization from the MAO as a representative of the DA.  
Observations of a fish warden meeting led by the fishery technician on June 21, 
2009, reflect the lack of trust and legitimacy for the CRM programs led by the MAO. The 
fishery technician was over an hour late and did not apologize to the fish wardens who 
were present nor did she set an agenda for the meeting. Several fish wardens had talked at 
the same time and appeared to mock some of the statements of the fishery technician. The 
fish warden leader who was frustrated with the situation, stepped out of the meeting after 
the fishery technician had honestly questioned a technical issue of using GPS coordinates 
when fish wardens apprehend illegal commercial fishers. When I asked the fish warden 
leader about his frustration, he mentioned that he was mainly offended because he has 
genuinely offered to provide information to the fishery technician and the MAO 
numerous times for the past couple of years. Despite his numerous attempts, the MAO 
and fishery technician have not only disregarded his offers, but have shown no interest to 
learn further about CRM and CLE. An underlying issue with the situation is that the fish 
warden leader, not having the same institutional rank, power, and education status as the 
MAO and fishery technician, has put all of his effort to learn about CRM and CLE in the 
municipality. On the other hand, the MAO and the fishery technician openly disregard 
their CRM and CLE responsibilities because they believe that it is the fish wardens who 
are accountable for all aspects of CRM and CLE within the municipality.
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Analysis: Making Sense of Institutional conflict and accountability 
 
 
Figure 8. Relationships among MFARMC members at the municipal level 
 Figure 8 illustrates answers to my first and second research questions concerning 
stakeholder perceptions and relationships of institutional accountability for CRM. This 
figure shows members of the local government and MFARMC who are responsible for 
dealing with CRM issues. The Mayor potentially oversees all activities within the local 
government. With consultation from the MFARMC, the SB or municipal council enacts 
CRM ordinances. The weak relationships among the SB, MAO, and the fishery 
technician implies the inadequate communication among the parties (dotted arrows in 
Figure 8). Institutional conflict in the municipal level is shown by the thick jagged arrow 
between the MPDC and the MAO, particularly because of the contrasting stakeholder 
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perceptions of accountability for CRM and CLE initiatives within the municipality. 
Because the MAO and the fishery technician do not consider their responsibilities as key 
members of the MFARMC and as consultants to the SB, there is the uneven burden of 
costs and sharing of responsibilities for implementing CRM. This is exemplified by the 
MPDC’s perception of having to do more multi-tasking to support CRM and the fish 
wardens. Interviews with the MPDC indicate that in addition to managing other 
community development projects in the municipality, the MPDC has to face more duties 
such as the provision of budget and technical equipment for fish wardens and CRM. 
Institutional accountability issues results in the sparse communication among 
MFARMC members who have a profound influence on the direction of CRM programs 
within the municipality. Consequently, the weak communication and the uneven burden 
of CRM responsibilities compromise the local trust and legitimacy of the MFARMC as a 
collaborative institution to effectively implement CRM programs. 
The issue of institutional accountability and conflict does not end at the municipal 
level. The fish wardens and the NGO representatives who serve as mediators between the 
community and municipality are also affected by the issue of institutional accountability 
for CRM (Figure 9). The fish wardens work directly with the MPDC, have secured the 
Mayor’s trust and indirectly work with the municipal council that legislates local CRM 
ordinances. Despite the numerous relationships between the fish wardens and the local 
government, the lack of direction and leadership from the MAO appears to be a serious 
issue for the fish wardens (see jagged lines, Figure 9). The fish wardens believe that the 
MAO’s denial and apathy in relation to her job are detrimental to the CRM and CLE 
activities that fish wardens actively participate in. Similar to the fish warden perceptions, 
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the NGO representative who has a strong working relationship with almost all key 
stakeholders believes that the MAO should do her CRM duties as mandated by local and 
national laws (Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. Relationships among MFARMC members, fish wardens, and the NGO. 
The interviews revealed that all of the stakeholder perceptions clearly point to the 
inability of the MAO and the fishery technician to face the legally mandated duty of 
overseeing CRM in the municipality.  These perceptions are portrayed by the jagged lines 
arising from the eight fish wardens, MPDC, and NGO representatives and directly point 
to the MAO and fishery technician (Figure 9). While I was unable to interview members 
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of the municipal council, we had the opportunity to interview the mayor. When I asked 
the mayor about CRM initiatives in the municipality, the very first thing he mentioned 
was “You need to talk to the fish warden leader.” According to the fish warden leader, 
the mayor appears to “stand back from CRM issues” and occasionally converses with the 
fish warden leader about coastal law enforcement issues (see relationship arrow in Figure 
9). Interestingly, when I interviewed the seven local government members, every single 
one of them directed us to talk to the fish warden leader about CRM issues.  
The gaps of implementing CRM initiatives by key players of the local government 
and MFARMC team has led to the diversion of most, if not all, CRM and CLE 
responsibilities to the MPDC and the fish wardens. The fish wardens, who are not 
officially part of the local government, are left to face many of the CLE and CRM issues 
without having the capacity, sufficient financial support, and concerted action from the 
MFARMC and local government. An interesting result of the institutional disorganization 
and accountability issues is the absence of the FARMC at the community level for the 
past four years (see blank circle in Figure 10). The Philippine fishery laws of the 1990s 
mandate the local government, in particular the MAO, to form FARMCs at community or 
barangay level.  The lack of the FARMC corresponds to the weakened or almost 
inexistent co-management relationship between the local government, the fish wardens 





Figure 10. Conflict map showing stakeholder relationships within and across the 
municipality and community. 
 The diversion of CRM responsibilities to the fish wardens and the MPDC reflects 
the inadequate trickledown effect of ineffective communication and enforcement of CRM 
policies at the community level (Figure 10). Based on institutional accountability issues 
and the resulting inadequate communication of CRM policies, it makes sense to 
investigate which key people within the local government carry the responsibility of 
102 
 
supporting fish wardens and ensuring the co-management relationship between the local 
government and the community. The MPDC has openly recognized the need of further 
support and direction for the fish wardens. The municipal council and the rest of the local 
government appreciates and supports the CRM activities, especially the revenue 
generating activities such as the dive user fees collected by the fish wardens. Most 
importantly, the mayor has allotted a small honorarium for fish wardens to do a 24-hour 
patrol of the municipal waters, including the municipality’s MPA.   
Further interviews with the fish wardens reveal that they feel that they have 
support and the trust from the Mayor to perform their said duties. However, the leader of 
the fish wardens mentioned that there is only verbal support from the local government, 
but no sufficient leadership and action necessary to address CRM issues. Whenever court 
cases and appearances are filed, it is always the leader of the fish wardens who directly 
deals with lawyers and addresses apprehension issues. Several cases with Philippine 
National Police (PNP) showed the lack of concern of PNP officials in attending coastal 
law enforcement workshops and even apprehending illegal fishers. The jagged 
relationship arrow in Figure 10 illustrates this relationship between the fish wardens and 
the PNP. Upon researching all the 2008 police reports on CRM, it was the fish warden 
leader who wrote or blotted seven of the eight cases reported for violators of CRM 
policies. 
Despite the varying channels of institutional support for the fish wardens, it 
appears as though the inability of the MAO and fishery technician to recognize their 
institutional roles as key players of the MFARMC have resulted in the disorganization of 
CRM programs and the burden of responsibilities to be faced by the fish wardens and the 
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MPDC. Oftentimes, fish wardens do not have the full capacity to organize and head CRM 
programs because it is the legal duty for local government members such as the MAO 
and the fishery technician. The honorariums of the fish wardens only allow them to do 





Figure 11. Stakeholder relationships among the MPA Network, municipality, and 
community. 
The NGO and the MPA Network provide technical, financial, and even legal 
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support for the fish wardens and community organizations in the municipality (Figure 
11). These two organizations appear to be the key players in filling the institutional gap 
for CRM programs. The NGO has provided information through education campaigns, 
technical training, and capacity building workshops for fish wardens and local 
governments since the early 2000s. The MPA Network is a social network of local 
governments that provide support for member municipality’s CRM programs (see strong 
relationships arrows in Figure 11). This network provides opportunities for local 
governments to share CRM and CLE issues, and collaboratively come up with local 
ordinances and initiatives. One of the MPA Networks’ initiatives is the formation of 
MUSCLE (Municipal Seaborne and Coastal Law Enforcers), a group of fish warden 
representatives from eight neighboring municipalities who occasionally patrol all 
municipal waters of the region. MUSCLE does not only support the fish warden patrol, 
but it also serves as an outlet for all municipalities to address common issues with CRM 
and CLE.  Another example of the MPA Network’s initiatives is the monthly meetings 
held at the different member municipalities. The municipality’s MPA Network 
representative and secretariat often communicates the necessities of coastal law 
enforcement and CRM programs to the network. While many issues are prioritized within 
the MPA Network, the opportunity for the municipality’s stakeholders to share their 
CRM issues serve as the starting point for the collaborative process of understanding the 
conflict of institutional accountability and its effects on their community. Questions 
pertaining to institutional and co-management issues of enacting and enforcing CRM 
ordinances are brought to the table and discussed among the MPA Network members. 
These collaborative meetings have the potential to reflect the interdependencies among 
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local governments of the region, as well as among municipal local governments and 
community members that co-manage the coastal resources. The acknowledgement of 
these interdependencies is crucial for managing the conflict of institutional accountability 
for CRM. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 Institutional accountability for CRM initiatives is the crux of the conflict 
occurring in the municipality. Specifically, it is the negligence of key players within the 
local government, in particular the MAO and fishery technician, who contribute to the 
additional burden of responsibilities faced by the fish wardens and other members of the 
MFARMC team such as the MPDC. It is not that the MFARMC team, fish wardens, local 
government members, and NGOs are against the MAO and the fishery technician; the 
case is that fish wardens, the rest of the MFARMC team, and community members need 
the MAO and fishery technician’s active participation, support, and accountability for 
CRM initiatives.  
 Common coastal law enforcement issues such as illegal commercial fishing 
within the municipal waters are directly affected by the MAO and the fishery technician’s 
negligence of their CRM duties. If the fish wardens endure the entire burden of CRM, 
including coastal law enforcement, the fish wardens and other members of the MFARMC 
team such as the MPDC will perform those crucial duties with limited power and 
resources. Moreover, the different communities within the municipality are consequently 
affected by the negligence of CRM duties. The significance and enforcement of CRM 
ordinances is not effectively communicated to the public because of the lack of the 
MFARMC at the community level depicting the dysfunctionalities of the co-management 
approach among the different communities and the local government. The weak 
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communication of CRM initiatives and policies leads to an unclear understanding of 
coastal policies among stakeholders within the different communities. Moreover, these 
weakly communicated CRM initiatives leads to a lack of trust and legitimacy for the 
policies, LGU, MFARMC, and potentially the fish wardens promoting CRM. In short, 
institutional conflicts and neglect of responsibilities within the MFARMC team have a 
dynamic effect on the fish wardens who enforce the CRM policies as well as the 
community members who comply with and support such policies.  
Facing institutional conflict and accountability for CRM has been not been 
directly or formally addressed by responsible stakeholder parties. There is common 
ground among stakeholders for accepting the existence of institutional conflict and 
accountability of the MAO to lead municipal CRM programs. The legal framework of 
Philippine fishery laws provides the institutional structure and capacity for the DA and 
the MAO and fishery technician as part of the local government and MFARMC team to 
head CRM programs. However, the main issue is not necessarily finding common ground 
that institutional conflict exists, but rather getting accountable parties, namely the MAO 
and fishery technician as part of the MFARMC team, to acknowledge assigned duties 
mandated by Philippine Fishery laws and the municipality’s CRM plan. Furthermore, 
there is the necessity to acknowledge the issue of other MFARMC members, such as the 
fish wardens and the MPDC, that bear the burden of additional tasks denied or forgone by 
the MAO and the fishery technician. Institutional accountability is a serious problem, as 
specifically stated in separate interviews with the MPDC, fish wardens Leader, and CCE 
representatives. There is the crucial need for the LGU, and the MFARMC team to 
address questions that focus on the consequences that institutional accountability has for 
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the community and the ecological integrity of the coastal resources. 
There have been many past conflict management strategies, such as collaborative 
meetings with the LGU and the MPA Network that have dealt with coastal management 
and coastal law enforcement issues in the municipality. Despite these conflict 
management strategies, the issue of institutional accountability has been side stepped by 
focusing on the more productive efforts of directly improving coastal law enforcement 
through the efforts of the fish wardens. For example, in the July 2009 monthly meeting of 
the MPA Network held in the municipality, the issue of institutional accountability and 
the MAO’s responsibility for dealing with CRM issues was brought up in one of the 
statements of the LGU members of the municipality. Instead of delving further into this 
issue, the CRM council of the MPA Network focused on the usual broad topic of 
effectively enforcing coastal management laws for all municipalities. It was not 
productive for the MPA Network to focus only on the institutional conflicts of the 
municipality. The MPA Network represents LGU members of eight different 
municipalities, including the said municipality and can only recommend ordinances, but 
not make municipal decisions to member municipalities. While the MPA Network 
provides continual support for the municipality, the LGU and MFARMC of the 
municipality and not the MPA Network can only directly address institutional conflicts 
within the municipality.  
Establishing common ground for institutional accountability in the municipality 
begs for a small, facilitated meeting where key stakeholders can get together in an 
informal manner and express their perspectives and experience on the issue. Because 
institutional accountability is a very personal and political issue, an informal and non-
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public setting would allow stakeholders to openly converse and view other parties as 
rational people with personal needs instead of their government positions known by the 
public.  The underlying issues of power and rank among MFARMC members and fish 
wardens could potentially be diffused in an informal non-public workshop where 
stakeholders can express sentiments influencing their positions of CRM issues. 
Moreover, a small workshop attended by the MAO, fishery technician, MPDC, and the 
fish warden members could potentially cultivate social learning opportunities necessary 
to discuss CRM and understand the importance of stakeholders’ roles in managing 
coastal issues within the community. 
Another aspect to institutional accountability is realizing the consequences of 
institutional conflicts affecting the public or community perceptions of the legitimacy 
CRM initiatives and policies. In this case, a public setting for a workshop that integrates 
communication with different community members (e.g. fishers, fish vendors, and dive 
resort owners) and the MFARMC team would be more appropriate. A public workshop 
would enable MFARMC members to link public perceptions of CRM with the 
consequent effects of institutional accountability and conflict within the MFARMC team. 
A series of separate small and private stakeholder workshops among MFARMC 
members is recommended to achieve the greater understanding of perceived roles of 
MFARMC members in tackling coastal issues. These workshops would also enable 
MFARMC members to discuss how the MFARMC can function effectively as the lead 
CRM organization in the municipality. Moreover, these workshops serve as an attempt to 
manage the conflict of institutional accountability in CRM within the municipality. 
Conflict management strategies in these workshops could employ facilitation techniques 
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such as systemic questioning, appreciative inquiry, and a discussion of common futures 
necessary for understanding the relationships and interdependencies of the MFARMC 
team and the significance of institutional accountability in CRM. 
The conflict management strategies recommended for this situation would not be 
effective without accommodating specific cultural traits that serve as potential barriers to 
effective communication. For example, one of these cultural traits is being timid or hiya, 
which may be dealt with by creating a secure environment for expressing emotions and 
motives in a manner where stakeholders will not lose face. Moreover, these cultural traits 
are linked with the role of power that influences fish wardens to effectively communicate 
their concerns to authority figures within the local government and the MFARMC. 
Skilled facilitators intimately aware of the linkages between cultural traits and power can 
effectively apply Western conflict management strategies to the conflict of institutional 
accountability for CRM. As a result, these conflict management strategies allow the very 
essence of communicating needs and ideas among MFARMC members and community 
members to constructively acknowledge and further understand the coastal issues 
affecting the entire municipality. 
 Understanding context specific coastal issues in the municipality and managing 
the conflict of institutional accountability for CRM requires an in depth analysis of 
stakeholder perceptions of the municipal, community, and MPA Network roles in 
tackling coastal issues. In particular, the analysis of institutional accountability involves 
understanding the relationships and interactions of the MFARMC team as the legitimate 
and legally designated governmental organization to manage coastal resource issues 
within the municipality. Conflict assessment tools such as conflict mapping help us to 
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understand and visualize the relationships and interactions among salient stakeholders, 
including the MAO, fishery technician, MPDC, fish wardens, and NGOs. Understanding 
the interactions among the fish wardens as representatives of the community and the 
MFARMC municipality representatives help clarify the dynamic effects of institutional 
accountability on the management of salient coastal issues potentially influencing public 
support and community perceptions concerning the legitimacy of CRM policies and 
initiatives. Lastly, the analysis of stakeholder relationships and interactions helps to 
increase our understanding of the capacities, limitations and institutional roles of existing 
organizations, such as the MPA Network and NGOs that provide support and 
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 This thesis investigated stakeholder perceptions including attitudes and normative 
beliefs of CRM scenarios and policies. Specifically, both manuscripts addressed conflict, 
consensus, and acceptability for CRM using quantitative and qualitative social science 
research methods. Research findings were linked to public support and compliance for 
coastal management policies influencing the community, municipality, and the MPA 
Network.  
Understanding Conflict and Consensus through Complimentary Research Methods 
The first manuscript investigated normative beliefs of fishers and compared the 
amounts of consensus for normative beliefs of CRM scenarios and policies among the 
municipalities of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan in Southern Cebu, Philippines. The 
Potential for Conflict Index (PCI2) statistic measured the amount of consensus 
concerning the acceptability of CRM policies (Vaske et al., 2010). Data for calculating 
the PCI2 originated from structured face-to-face interviews with fishers concerning the 
acceptability and support for certain CRM policies and scenarios. The amount of 
consensus for a given CRM scenario or policy reflected the amount of potential conflict.  
The PCI2 is a tool for understanding consensus and conflict for CRM policies and 
initiatives. Moreover, the PCI2 offers an intuitive graphical display of consensus easily 
comprehended by managers and local governments with little to no statistical training. 
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Lastly, the PCI2 serves as a quantitative social science monitoring tool for local 
governments and coastal managers to understand and measure human dimension issues 
that significantly influence the success of CRM initiatives. 
 The second manuscript was a case study examining institutional conflict and 
accountability in one of the municipalities of Southern Cebu. The construction of conflict 
maps, a series of qualitative maps illustrating stakeholder attitudes and perceptions of 
institutional conflict and accountability in CRM, was the main method used to investigate 
conflict. The conflict mapping process and in-depth interviews revealed the relationships 
between stakeholders within the community, municipality, and the MPA network. Lastly, 
the conflict mapping process linked stakeholder relationships with the overall issue of 
institutional accountability, organization, and processes affecting different stakeholder 
groups.  
The conflict mapping process can serve as a qualitative social science tool and 
method for managers to get an in-depth investigation of conflict in CRM concerning key 
stakeholders. The collaborative process of constructing conflict maps with stakeholders 
allowed the understanding different perspectives and attitudes of a given situation. As a 
result, conflict mapping can set the stage for recommended conflict management 
processes such systemic questioning and appreciative inquiry applied in a series of 
collaborative workshops. 
Summary of Findings 
Manuscript 1  
Fishers’ normative beliefs indicated general acceptability of CRM, including MPA 
management and fishery policies. There was less acceptance and consensus for policies 
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that involved regulating municipal waters outside of MPA borders, such as fish gear 
registration and the provision of fishing permits to non-residents. These results suggest 
that MPA policies are somewhat acceptable and supported by fishers from these 
municipalities, reflecting well-enforced and established norms of small no-take MPAs. 
Moreover, regulating fishing effort (e.g., regulating fish gear and restricting access to 
non-resident fishers) beyond MPA boundaries are emerging norms that potentially create 
conflict among resource users and local government. Implications for these results 
indicate early institutional attempts to implement Ecosystem-Based Management (EBM), 
where fisheries management spans beyond MPAs and includes regulating a network of 
jurisdictional waters of a region (Christie et al., 2009; Eisma-Osorio et al., 2009).  
The legitimacy of norms and sanctions are crucial for sustaining acceptability and 
compliance for coastal management policies (Christie et al., 2009). Sanctions for 
dynamite and cyanide fishing were the most acceptable for fishers, implying a well-
enforced and established norm for these municipalities. Enforcing sanctions for fish pot 
use were the least acceptable among fishers potentially due to low consensus and national 
legislation currently legalizing its use.  
Normative beliefs concerning the acceptability of CRM policies significantly 
differed among municipalities. In general, Oslob fishers had the most acceptance and 
consensus for CRM and fishing violations sanctions while Samboan fishers had the least 
acceptance and consensus. Municipality differences imply various management styles 
and localized norms for enforcing national fishery laws. These management styles may 





Conflicts concerning institutional accountability for CRM were often at the root 
of problems implementing and enforcing coastal management initiatives and policies 
within the different communities of the municipality. Specifically, it was the negligence 
of key players within the local government who contributed to the additional burden of 
responsibilities faced by fish wardens and other local government officials responsible 
for CRM. The analysis of institutional accountability involved understanding the 
relationships and interactions of the MFARMC team as the legitimate and legally 
designated governmental organization to manage coastal resource issues within the 
municipality. 
Common coastal law enforcement issues, such as illegal commercial fishing, are 
also influenced by the negligence of local government representatives accountable for 
CRM. As a result, fish wardens and other MFARMC members, performed their duties 
with limited power and resources. Moreover, the different communities within the 
municipality were consequently affected by the negligence of CRM duties. The 
significance and enforcement of CRM policies was not effectively communicated to the 
public because of the lack of the MFARMC at the community level. This situation 
depicted the dysfunctionalities of the co-management approach among the different 
communities and the local government. The weak communication of CRM initiatives and 
policies lead to an unclear understanding of coastal policies among stakeholders within 
the different communities. Moreover, these weakly communicated CRM initiatives 
resulted in the lack of trust and legitimacy for the policies, LGU, MFARMC, and 
potentially the fish wardens promoting CRM.  In short, institutional conflicts and neglect 
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of responsibilities within the MFARMC team had a dynamic effect on the fish wardens 
who enforce the CRM policies as well as the community members who comply with and 
support such policies. 
Integration of Findings  
 Both manuscripts of this thesis investigated CRM scenarios and conflicts by 
examining attitudes and normative beliefs through quantitative and qualitative social 
science methods. The first manuscript examined the acceptability of CRM policies and 
the potential for conflict to occur in specific CRM scenarios, such as the regulation of 
fishing effort. Quantitative social science methods and analyses such as the structured 
interviews and the PCI2 statistic were applied in the first manuscript. On the other hand, 
qualitative methods such as conflict mapping and in-depth interviews were applied in the 
second manuscript. 
 While both manuscripts applied different social science methods to analyze conflict 
in CRM, each manuscript focused on different issues concerning CRM scenarios. The 
first manuscript focused on the acceptability of certain CRM policies while the second 
manuscript focused on institutional accountability for CRM initiatives within a 
municipality. Despite the differences in both manuscripts, the concepts of public support 
and acceptance for CRM initiatives were common to both manuscripts. Moreover, the 
legitimacy of certain CRM policies appeared to be a common theme throughout both 
manuscripts. In the first manuscript, there was low acceptability and consensus for CRM 
policies concerning sanctions for potentially destructive fishing practices such as fish pot 
use that are legalized and legitimized by national Fishery laws. Likewise, the second 
manuscript highlights the effect of institutional conflict and accountability on community 
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perceptions concerning the legitimacy of CRM policies. Stakeholder perceptions, 
including attitudes and normative beliefs concerning the legitimacy of CRM policies 
consequently influence conflict, consensus, and community support for CRM proposals 
and initiatives (Kuperan & Suitenen, 1998). 
Managerial Implications  
Understanding norms and consensus for CRM scenarios enables managers and 
local government institutions to better manage conflict and garner public support and 
compliance for coastal policies. Conflict is not only influenced by consensus for such 
policies, but norms concerning the legitimacy, enforcement, and sanctions associated 
with CRM policies. Context-specific CRM scenarios reflect norms that guide managers 
to focus on policies and proposals salient to fishers. Moreover, the identification of these 
salient policies can direct managers to investigate specific issues directly affecting 
compliance and support for certain CRM policies and initiatives.  
 Investigating context specific coastal issues and managing the conflict of 
institutional accountability for CRM requires an in depth analysis of stakeholder 
perceptions of the municipal, community, and MPA Network roles in managing coastal 
issues. In particular, the analysis of institutional conflict and accountability involves 
understanding the relationships and interactions of institutions such as the MFARMC as 
the legitimate and legally designated governmental organization to manage coastal 
resource issues within the municipality.  
 Recommended conflict assessment tools such as conflict mapping in collaborative 
workshops help us to understand and visualize the relationships and interactions among 
key stakeholders. Understanding the interactions among the fish wardens as 
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representatives of the community and the MFARMC municipality representatives clarify 
the dynamic effects of institutional accountability on the management of salient coastal 
issues potentially influencing public support and community perceptions concerning the 
legitimacy of CRM policies and initiatives. Lastly, the conflict mapping analysis of 
stakeholder relationships and interactions increases our understanding of the capacities, 
limitations and institutional roles of existing organizations, such as the MPA Network and 
NGOs that provide support and opportunities for managing institutional conflict and 
accountability for CRM. 
Theoretical Implications and Future Studies 
 Combining the use of quantitative and qualitative social science methods can help 
advance our theoretical understanding and analyses of the relationships between 
stakeholder perceptions, conflict, consensus, and public support for CRM policies and 
initiatives. Specifically, this thesis applied the PCI2 statistic and qualitative conflict 
mapping methods to understand context-specific situations concerning the acceptability 
for CRM policies and scenarios. The PCI2 applied normative theories, including the 
concept of personal and social norms in examining the acceptability and consensus of 
CRM policies and scenarios (Vaske et al., 2010).  On the other hand, qualitative conflict 
mapping methods applied conflict analyses and management frameworks (Daniels & 
Walker, 1998) to an in-depth investigation of key stakeholder attitudes of specific 
institutional accountability conflicts occurring within a municipality.  
 The combined use of PCI2 and conflict mapping in different coastal management 
settings can potentially enable local government officials and managers to get a clearer 
picture of social situations and conflicts directly affecting the success of CRM programs 
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and initiatives. Future studies could include the analysis of stakeholder evaluations of 
current and proposed CRM policies through the PCI2 along with the collaborative 
discussion of PCI2 values with local government officials and coastal managers. The 
discussion could occur in a workshop wherein key stakeholders apply the conflict 
mapping process to understand and discuss certain PCI2 values. For example, the 
presentation of certain PCI2 values regarding the regulation of fishing effort can catalyze 
further discussion and analyses among concerned managers and local government 
officials. Conflict mapping can be used to further analyze the conflict and understand 
stakeholder relationships and perceptions, as well external factors directly influencing the 
situation of regulating fishing effort. These quantitative and qualitative methods serve as 
social science monitoring tools enabling managers and local governments to monitor and 
understand issues concerning CRM initiatives. Moreover, these social science monitoring 
tools enable the in-depth analyses of the social success of CRM initiatives applying 
recent management frameworks such as EBM. 
 CRM utilizes frameworks such as Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) and 
EBM to manage social and ecological issues affecting the sustainable use of coastal 
resources. This thesis focused on stakeholder perceptions, including attitudes and 
normative beliefs, of common CRM scenarios and policies. Conflicts associated with 
stakeholder perceptions of CRM policies are invariably linked with human dimension 
research themes of governance, communities, stakeholder perceptions of policies, and 
socioeconomics. The first manuscript’s examination of municipality differences among 
fishers’ normative beliefs of CRM policies and scenarios reflected different local 
government management styles for managing their municipal waters. The second 
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manuscript’s investigation of stakeholders’ attitudes of institutional accountability in 
CRM initiatives displayed the effects of institutional conflicts, community-based 
management, and co-governance models among stakeholders representing the 
communities, municipality, and MPA Network. The strong linkages between 
stakeholders’ attitudes and normative beliefs with CRM research themes of governance, 
communities, and socio-economics call for further studies on stakeholder perceptions of 
CRM policies and scenarios. Moreover, further research is needed on understanding the 
effects of public support and compliance for new and emerging EBM policies as 
indicators for social success of coastal management programs in small fishing-subsistent 
communities, such as the Philippines. Lastly, additional research is needed on the 
integration of social and biological success indicators of CRM initiatives. This research 
would be crucial for achieving the balance of managing coastal ecosystems that sustain 
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This report presents results of the 2009 Fisher Perceptions of Coastal Resource 
Management (CRM) survey. Specifically, survey results concern fishers’ attitudes, 
normative beliefs, behavioral intentions and support for CRM regulations and initiatives. 
Survey results pertain to fishers residing the municipalities of Oslob, Samboan, and 
Santander in Southeastern Cebu, Philippines. 
 
Arren Mendezona Allegretti conducted this survey as part of her graduate research at the 
Human Dimensions of Natural Resources Department of Colorado State University. This 
document is a special report for the Coastal Conservation Education (CCE) foundation 
summarizing stakeholder perceptions of CRM and demographic information as 
socioeconomic indicators for public support, compliance, and acceptability of coastal 
management. 
Purpose 
The purpose of study is to explore stakeholder perceptions, specifically fishers’ attitudes, 
normative beliefs, and behavioral intentions for supporting CRM regulations and 
initiatives. The survey is categorized into four parts: 
 
Section I. Attitudes 
Section II. Normative Beliefs 
Section III. Behavioral Intentions/Support 
Section IV. Demographics 
 
Similarly, this report is organized according the survey sections outlined above. The 
survey reflected fishers’ perceptions and evaluations regarding the acceptability and 
awareness of specific CRM regulations, initiatives, and management scenarios. These 
included fishers’ acceptability of fish gear and fish method policies, fisher registration, 
Marine Protected Area (MPA) policies, MPA community-based and co-management 
scenarios, fish warden or Bantay Dagat Operations, sanctions for violators of CRM 
policies, resident/non-resident fishing in municipal waters, and CRM educational 
workshops. These CRM policies and scenarios reflected the policies listed in the 
municipal ordinances of Oslob, Santander, and Samboan that were patterned after the 





Fishers were purposefully sampled to represent the municipalities of Oslob, Santander, 
and Samboan. Onsite surveys were administered to fishers through face-to-face 
interviews. Survey response rates were approximately 95%. Interviews were conducted 
from June-August, 2009. 
Sample  
 
The total sample was 511, representing southern Cebu municipalities of Oslob (n = 279), 
Santander (n = 139) and Samboan (n = 87). An official list of registered fishers was 
obtained from the municipalities of Oslob and Santander. There was no official list for 
the municipality of Samboan. Table 1 shows the sample sizes, the number of registered 
fishers, and the percentages of the population of registered fishers. Table 2 shows the 
number of respondents representing the communities or barangays of each municipality.  
 
Table 1.  Study Sample Sizes 




Oslob 279 1012 28% 
Santander 139 376 37% 
Samboan 87 - - 
Table 2. Samples sizes representing barangays of each Municipality 
Barangays per Municipality Sample (n) % 
Oslob   
Alo 18 7 
Bangcogon 12 4 
Bonbon 41 15 
Calumpang 9 3 
Daanlungsod 7 2 
Gawi 18 6 
Hagdan 11 4 
Looc 20 7 
Luka 16 6 
Mainit 23 9 
Nueve Caceres 32 11 
Poblacion 16 6 
Pungtod 15 5 
Tan-awan 31 11 
Tumalog 10 4 
Total 279 100 
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 Table 2 continued. 
Barangays per Municipality Sample (n) % 
Santander   
Bunlan 5 3 
Cabutongan 1 1 
Candamiang 23 16 
Liloan 7 5 
Liptong 1 1 
Looc 8 6 
Pasil 47 34 
Poblacion 10 7 
Canlumacad 24 17 
Talisay 7 5 
Tagaytay 1 1 
Katali 1 1 
Salay 3 2 
Canlabag 1 1 
Total 139 100 
Samboan   
Basak 5 6 
Cambigong 10 11 
Canorong 16 18 
Colase 44 51 
Dalahikan 1 1 
San Sebastian 6 7 
Suba 5 6 
Total 87 100 
 
Upland (n = 65) and coastal barangays (n = 161) of Santander and Samboan were also 
sampled and compared with one another. 
Statistical Analysis  
Descriptive statistics including frequencies and measures of central tendency (mean, 
median, standard deviations) were used to show the attitudes, normative beliefs, 
behavioral intentions and support for CRM regulations and initiatives. These results 
pertain to survey sections I, II, and III respectively .The acceptability and consensus for 
these CRM regulations and initiatives are presented through Analysis of Variance 





Results are reported to show fishers’ attitudes, normative beliefs, behavioral intentions 
and support for CRM regulations, initiatives, and management scenarios .The 
acceptability and amount of consensus for fishers’ evaluations of CRM policies and 
scenarios are reported in sections II, III, and IV. Demographics of fishers, including 
educational attainment and household size are reported in Section IV. 
Survey Section I. Fishers’ Attitudes of CRM policies and initiatives 











Approval of MPA location 26 44 5 13 12 2.40 
Approval of the MPA 
within your community 
21 49 8 11 11 2.42 
Approval of MPA zones 23 56 10 9 2 2.12 
Prohibition of all types of 
fishing in MPA 
40 33 5 13 9 2.19 
Prohibition of gleaning for 
sea life in MPA  
37 35 5 13 10 2.24 
Prohibition of taking corals 
in MPA 
47 35 4 7 7 1.94 
 Prohibition of taking sand 
from MPA 
44 34 5 9 8 2.04 
 Prohibition of taking rocks 
from MPA 
44 34 6 8 8 2.02 
 Prohibition of building 
foreshore structures in MPA 
37 30 11 13 9 2.28 
 Prohibition of paddle boats 
in MPA during low tide  
31 36 7 15 11 2.38 
 Prohibition of Anchoring 
within MPA 
41 32 5 13 9 2.17 
Prohibition of motorized 
vessels within MPA 
38 28 8 16 10 2.31 
Overall Approval of MPA 
regulations 
10 2 40 20 8 2.94 
1
Means correspond to five point scale of strongly agree (1), agree (2), strongly disagree (3), disagree (4), 





Table 3 highlights: 
 70% of respondents approve of their MPA locations, while 25% disapprove  
 40% of respondents are unsure about their overall approval of MPA regulations 
and 12% of other respondents approve their MPA regulations 
 26% of respondents disapprove of prohibiting motorized vessels within MPA. 
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Fishers’ evaluations from upland and coastal barangays/communities  
Figure 1. Evaluations on MPA purpose  
 








Figure 1 and 2 highlights: 
 Residents from upland barangays evaluated themselves as being more informed 
on the purpose of their MPA. Coastal barangays evaluated themselves as less 
informed on their MPA purpose. The level of consensus (PCI2 = .5) for coastal  
barangays was significantly less than upland barangays, indicating a greater 
potential for conflict. 
 Both upland and coastal barangays felt that the MPA was slightly beneficial to 
their livelihood. 
 
Figure 3.  Overall Approval of MPA  
 
 
Figure 3 highlights: 
 Both upland and coastal barangays somewhat approve of their MPA. However, 
coastal barangays had more disagreement and less consensus (PCI2= .55) for their 




Survey Section II. Fishers’ Normative Beliefs of CRM policies and initiatives 
Table 4. Fishers’ normative beliefs of CRM policies 
1
Means correspond to five point scale of strongly agree (1), agree (2), strongly disagree (3), disagree 












1a.Necessity of buoys to mark 
MPA 
40 36 7 11 6 2.1 
1b.Prohibition of fishing in MPA 41 38 4 10 7 2.1 
1c.Hook and line fishing in MPA 
buffer zone 
39 40 8 5 7 2.0 
1d.Zoning of fish pots 29 46 11 7 7 2.2 
1e. Municipal government 
regulating MPAs 
22 42 23 6 7 2.3 
If. People organizations managing 
MPAs 
16 36 36 5 6 2.5 
1g. Allotting diver user revenues to 
community 
30 40 19 6 5 2.2 
1h.Lack of communication 
between people’s organizations 
and municipal government 
15 25 46 8 6 2.7 
1i.Community’s opinion 
considered in MPA management 
24 39 25 6 6 2.4 
1j. Allotment of fish warden 
stipends regardless of whether 
violators are caught. 
23 39 18 9 10 2.4 
1k. Allotting violator fee revenues 
to fish wardens 
21 34 21 13 11 2.6 
1l.Difficulty of taking municipal 
general funds for fish warden 
9 20 52 11 8 2.9 
1m.Necessity of fish warden trust 
fund 
18 35 36 5 6 2.5 
1n.Trust for police in supporting 
fish wardens 
17 36 29 10 8 2.5 
1o.Preparedness of police for 
supporting fish wardens 
23 39 23 8 7 2.4 
1p. Fish gear regulations 22 39 14 14 11 2.5 
1q.Fishing permits for non-
residents 
22 30 8 21 19 2.8 
1r. Fish gear registration 19 31 12 22 16 2.8 
1s.Municipal benefits for fisher 
registration 
19 34 27 12 8 2.6 
1t. Fish sold within municipality 30 37 12 14 30 2.3 
1w.Increase of fish since MPA 
establishment 
17 28 32 16 7 2.7 
135 
 
*The numbers and letters associated with the CRM scenario/policy correspond to section II of the 
survey. For example, “1a Necessity of buoys to mark” MPA corresponds to the question 1a of section 
II in the survey. 
 
 
Table 4 highlights 
 Generally, fishers were acceptable (M  ≤ 2.8) of the CRM policies/scenarios 
outlined above. 
 76% of fishers agreed that more buoys were needed to mark the location of their 
MPA or sanctuary. 
 More than half of fishers (52%) were unsure about the difficulty of taking 
municipal general funds for fish wardens. Additionally, 36% were also unsure 
about People Organizations (POs) managing their MPA and allotting a trust fund 
for fish wardens. These results could be attributed to the CRM scenario being 
unknown and not salient to fishers’ experience. For example, fishers are unaware 
of fish warden needs, therefore not having sufficient information to evaluate the 
CRM scenario of allotting a trust fund for fish wardens. Furthermore, not all 
fishers are aware that a PO exists in their community, resulting in the lack of 
information for fishers to evaluate their PO. 
 Almost half of the fishers (44%) disagreed with statement that resident’s fish 
catch should be sold within the municipality. 
 40% of fishers disagreed with the statement that fishing permits should be given 
to non-resident fishers. 
 38% of the fishers disagreed with the statement that fish gear must be registered 
within the municipality. 
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Table 5. Fishers’ Normative Beliefs about the acceptability of sanctions for CRM scenarios 
1
Means correspond to five point scale of strongly agree (1), agree (2), strongly disagree (3), disagree 
(4), strongly disagree (5). For example, a mean of 2 depicts that respondents agreed to the CRM 
scenario 
*The numbers and letters associated with the CRM scenario/policy correspond to section II of the 
survey. For example, the CRM scenario of “2a Boats not registered to mark MPA” corresponds to the 
question 2a of section II in the survey. 
 
Table 5 highlights: 
 Generally, fishers were acceptable (M  ≤ 2.4) of sanctions applied to the CRM 
policies/scenarios outlined above. 
 90% of fishers agreed that sanctions should be applied to dynamite and cyanide 
fishing. 











2a.Boats not registered 35 44 5 9 8 2.1 
2b Non-residents fishing in 
municipal waters 
45 32 6 10 7 2.0 
2c.Cyanide Fishing 60 30 1 5 3 1.6 
2d.Fishers not registered 27 31 10 20 12 2.6 
2e.Commercial fishing in 
municipal waters 
56 33 3 6 3 1.7 
2f.Residents fishing in MPA 
no-take zone 
45 35 4 10 7 2.0 
2g.Larger fines for non-
residents fishing in MPA no-
take zone 
53 31 6 5 5 1.8 
2h.Use of fine mesh nets 28 33 14 17 8 2.4 
2i.Compressor fishing 54 32 5 5 3 1.7 
2j.Taking giant clams 29 35 13 14 9 2.4 
2k. Off-season fishing for 
rabbit fish 
34 31 11 15 10 2.4 
2l. Use of surface gill net 36 33 9 15 7 2.2 
2m.Dynamite fishing 63 28 1 4 4 1.6 
2n.Baby muro ami fishing 50 32 6 8 5 1.9 
2o. Lack of building permits 
for foreshore structures 
42 36 12 5 5 2.0 
2p. Fishing with superlights 53 30 8 5 4 1.8 
2q. Cutting of Mangroves 43 37 10 5 4 1.9 




 Table 6. Municipality Differences on Fishers’ normative beliefs about the acceptability of coastal 
resource management regulatory (CRM) scenarios  
 Municipality
1
    
CRM scenarios Oslob Santander Samboan F p-value  






 21.621 <.001 .284 






 14.365 <.001 .238 








 31.147 <.001 .338 






 4.858 <.001 .143 








 19.829 <.001 .274 








 29.401 <.001 .332 








 29.401 <.001 .329 
1h.Lack of communication between 








 52.339 <.001 .427 
1i.Community’s opinion considered 







 11.996 <.001 .218 
1j. Allotment of fish warden 
stipends regardless of whether 







 12.402 <.001 .221 
1k. Allotting violator fee revenues 







 14.968 <.001 .240 
1l.Difficulty of taking municipal 







 23.463 <.001 .299 








 22.024 <.001 .322 








 19.887 <.001 .282 
1o.Preparedness of police for 







 7.151 <.001 .170 






 6.441 .002 .165 






 13.897 <.001 .232 






 4.297 <.001 .133 








 6.472 .002 .162 




Table 6 continued. 






 14.851 <.001 .241 








 11.136 <.001 .209 








 20.175 <.001 .280 








 4.570 .011 .137 
1




) are significantly different at the p <.05 level 
based on the Tamhanes post hoc analysis.  
 
Table 6 highlights: 
 Fishers’ normative beliefs regarding the acceptability of CRM policies significantly 
differed among the municipalities of Oslob, Samboan, and Santander. Statistical 
differences were typical to substantial ( ≤ .338). Some of these included fishers’ 
trust for the police in support fish warden operations. These differences could be 
attributed to the differences in the way each municipality manages their coastal 
waters, including MPAs. 
 
 There is a substantial difference ( =. 427) among fishers’ normative beliefs 
regarding the lack of communication between People’s Organizations (POs) and 




Table 7. Municipality differences on normative beliefs about the acceptability of sanctions for 
coastal resource management scenarios. 
1




) are significantly different at the p <.05 level 
based on the Tamhanes post hoc analysis.  
*The numbers and letters associated with the CRM scenario/policy correspond to section II of the 
survey. For example, “2a Boats not registered to mark MPA” corresponds to the question 2a of 
section II in the survey 
 Municipality
1
    
CRM scenarios* Oslob Santander Samboan F p-value  






 11.151 <.001 0.211 















 12.269 <.001 0.221 






 3.097 .046 0.112 








 9.303 <.001 0.193 
2f.Residents fishing in 







 7.403 0.001 0.172 
2g.Larger fines for non-








 25.207 <.001 0.309 







 11.312 .001 0.215 
2j.Taking giant clams 0.664 0.626 0.435 1.048 0.351 0.065 








 8.410 <.001 0.184 













 8.357 <.001 0.184 
2n.Baby muro ami fishing 1.127 1.266 1.000 1.552 0.213 0.079 
2o. Lack of building 
permits for foreshore 
structures 
1.066 1.123 0.833 1.989 0.138 0.091 








 4.280 0.014 0.132 
2q. Cutting of Mangroves 1.133 1.117 0.988 0.634 0.531 0.052 
2r. Fish Pot Use -0.140 -0.072 -0.447 2.249 0.107 0.096 
140 
 
Table 7 highlights: 
 73% of fishers’ normative beliefs regarding the acceptability sanctions applied to 
CRM scenarios/policies significantly differed among the municipalities of Oslob, 
Samboan, and Santander. 80% of these differences were statistically minimal ( ≤ 
.221). 
  Typical statistical differences among fishers’ normative beliefs were sanctions 
applied to non-residents applied to fishing within municipal waters and larger fines 
given to non-residents fishing inside MPA no-take zone. 
 Generally, Samboan had the least level of acceptability (M ≤ 1 ) and Oslob having 
the greatest level of acceptability for sanctions applied to CRM policies/scenarios (M 
≤ 1.5 ). 
 All municipalities had lower levels of acceptability for sanctions applied to fishers 
not registered with the municipality. Oslob and Santander (M  ≤ 1) were more 
acceptable of this scenario than Samboan (M= 0.071). 
 Oslob and Samboan had the least level of acceptability for sanctions applied to fish 




Amount of Consensus for Fishers’ normative beliefs regarding the acceptability 
of selected CRM scenarios 
 
The amount of consensus for fishermen’s normative beliefs is primarily measured 
through the Potential for Conflict Index (PCI2). The PCI2 is calculated on the basis of a 
distance function between response scales of the survey. A PCI2 of 1 reflects the greatest 
potential for conflict because there is the least amount of consensus regarding the 
acceptability of a management or policy scenario. On the other hand, a PCI2 of 0 
corresponds to least potential for conflict because there is the most amount of consensus 
for a given management scenario. The bubble graphs below display respondent’s 
acceptability of management scenario (vertical axis) and the amount of consensus (PCI2) 
for that scenario (bubble size). A larger PCI2 displays a larger bubble, indicating more 
potential for conflict and less consensus for a given management scenario. Likewise, a 
smaller bubble illustrates a smaller PCI2, indicating less potential for conflict and more 
consensus for a given scenario. The center of the bubble illustrates the mean or the 
average respondent’s evaluation on the acceptability of a given management scenario.  
 
The PCI2 figures below are represented by red, peach, and yellow bubbles representing 
Oslob, Santander, and Samboan respectively.  
Figure 4. Acceptability and consensus for sanctions applied to unregistered boats, non-residents 





Figure 4 highlights: 
 Oslob, represented by the red bubble, generally has the most amount of 
consensus for sanctions applied to unregistered boats, non-residents fishing in 
municipal waters, and cyanide fishing. Oslob residents are also more likely to 
comply with these CRM scenarios because of their higher level of acceptability 
for CRM policies. 
 Sanctions applied to non-residents fishing in municipal waters would likely 
create conflict for Santander (represented by peach bubble) 
 Samboan (displayed by the yellow bubble) had the least amount of consensus 
and acceptability for sanctions applied for these CRM scenarios. Sanctions 
applied to non-resident fishing within municipal waters will create conflict for 
Samboan fishers (PCI2 = .59). 
 
 Figure 5. Acceptability and consensus for fish gear registration and sanctions applied to 
unregistered boats and fishers 
 
 
Figure 5 highlights: 
 All three municipalities had the same amounts of consensus regarding the 
acceptability of fish gear registration. Despite these similarities, the level of 
acceptability differed among municipalities. Samboan fishers generally believed 
that fish gear registration was unacceptable while Oslob and Santander were more 
unsure about their acceptability for fish gear registration 
 Oslob generally had the most amount acceptability and consensus for sanctions 
applied to unregistered boats and unregistered fishers.  
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 Santander had the least amount of consensus for sanctions applied to unregistered 
fishers. This municipality also had less consensus for sanctions applied to  
unregistered boats, indicating the greater potential for conflict to occur in this 
municipality 
 
 Samboan had least level of acceptability and consensus for all CRM scenarios in 
Figure 5. 




Figure 6 highlights: 
 Oslob and Samboan had similar levels of acceptability and amounts of consensus 
(PCI2≤.38). 
 
 Samboan had the least level of acceptability and amount of consensus, indicating 
the greater potential for conflict to occur regarding sanctions for fine mesh net use 








Figure 7. Acceptability and consensus for sanctions applied to fish port/bubo use and fish pot/bubo 
zoning. 
 
Figure 7 highlights: 
 All municipalities significantly had less acceptability and consensus for sanctions 
applied to bubo use as compared to bubo zoning 
 Oslob and Santander had the most level of acceptability and consensus for Bubo 
zoning 
 Samboan had the least level of acceptability and consensus for Bubo zoning 
 Conflict will likely occur for all municipalities if future regulatory actions employ 
sanctions for bubo use. 




Upland and coastal barangays’ acceptability and consensus for selected CRM 
scenarios 
Figure 8. Acceptability and consensus for fish gear policies, fishing permits, and consideration of 




Figure 8 highlights: 
 Upland barangays (represented by green bubbles) were more acceptable and had 
the most consensus for these CRM scenarios than coastal barangays (displayed by 
green bubbles). 
 Both upland and coastal barangays were less acceptable and had less consensus 
for providing fishing permits to non-resident fishers. Coastal barangays had 
significantly less consensus than upland barangays. 
 The larger PCI2 for coastal barangays may illustrate the diversity of strong 
opinions that are salient for fishers residing in coastal barangays.  
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Figure 9 highlights: 
 Upland barangays were more acceptable and had the most consensus for these 
CRM scenarios than coastal barangays. 
 The larger PCI2 for coastal barangays may illustrate the diversity of strong 
opinions that are salient for fishers residing in coastal barangays. The PCI2  also 
depicts less consensus for these CRM scenarios in coastal barangays, thereby 
increasing the greater potential for conflict 
 Both barangays were less acceptable of their fish catch increasing since the 





Table 8. Amount of Consensus for Fishers’ normative beliefs regarding the acceptability of CRM per 
municipality 











1a. Necessity of buoys to mark MPA    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.240 0.310 1.12 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.240 0.700 7.44* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.310 0.700 5.69* 
1b. Prohibition of fishing in MPA    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.400 0.200 2.86* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.400 0.620 2.84* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.200 0.620 4.90* 
1c. Hook and line fishing in MPA buffer zone    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.190 0.170 0.10 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.190 0.610 2.11* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.170 0.610 5.60* 
1d. Zoning of fish pots    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.270 0.240 0.44 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.270 0.510 2.63* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.240 0.510 2.79* 
1e. Municipal government regulating MPAs    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.180 0.140 0.770 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.180 0.420 3.85* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.140 0.420 4.09* 
1f. Fisher organizations managing MPAs    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.090 0.110 0.51 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.090 0.320 3.98* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.110 0.320 3.39* 
1g. Allotting diver user revenues to community    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.100 0.160 1.21 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.100 0.440 5.85* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.160 0.440 4.19* 
1h. Lack of communication between the 
community and municipal government 
   
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.080 0.060 0.70 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.080 0.230 2.77* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.060 0.230 3.06* 
1i. Community’s opinion considered in MPA management    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.120 0.220 0.98* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.120 0.360 3.730 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.220 0.360 1.960 
1j. Allotment of fish warden stipends regardless of whether violators 
are caught 
   
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.250 0.410 2.55* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.250 0.410 2.32* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.410 0.410 0.00 
1k.Allotting violator fee revenues to fish wardens    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.330 0.380 0.88 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.330 0.390 0.87 




Table 8 continued 











1l. Difficulty of taking municipal general funds for fish warden    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.100 0.120 0.66 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.100 0.190 1.85 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.120 0.190 1.32 
1m.Necessity of fish warden trust fund    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.110 0.110 0.00 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.110 0.250 2.35* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.110 0.250 2.28* 
1n. Trust for police in supporting fish wardens    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.170 0.240 1.40 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.170 0.390 3.56* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.240 0.390 2.230 
1m.Preparedness of police for supporting fish wardens    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.210 0.260 0.88 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.210 0.410 2.88* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.260 0.410 1.88 
1n.Fish gear regulations    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.380 0.420 0.63 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.380 0.530 2.11* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.420 0.530 1.330 
1o.Fishing permits for non-residents    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.560 0.610 0.890 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.560 0.540 0.310 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.610 0.540 0.920 
1q.Fish gear registration    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.520 0.520 0.00 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.520 0.520 0.00 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.520 0.520 0.00 
1r. Municipal benefits for fisher registration    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.210 0.350 2.37* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.210 0.440 3.57* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.350 0.440 1.16 
1s. Fish sold within municipality    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.320 0.320 0.00 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.320 0.590 4.07* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.320 0.590 3.38* 
1t. Increase of fish since MPA establishment    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.240 0.320 0.21 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.240 0.230 1.27 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.320 0.230 1.01 
1w.Persuasion of MPA educational workshops    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.110 0.130 0.53 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.110 0.320 5.29* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.130 0.320 4.20* 
1y.Personal understanding of MPA regulations    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.280 0.330 0.960 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.280 0.350 1.440 




PCI a = first PCI value of the comparison. For example, PCI a corresponds to the PCI value of Oslob 
in the comparison of Oslob versus Santander 
2
PCI b = second PCI value of the comparison. For example, PCI b corresponds to the PCI value of 
Santander in the comparison of Oslob versus Santander 




 Table 8 highlights: 
 Generally, fishers from Oslob (e.g., PCI2 = 0.12) had the most amount of 
consensus for their agreement with the CRM scenarios listed in Table 9. 
 Fishers from Samboan had the least amount of consensus for CRM 
scenarios/policies. 
 Fishers from Santander and Samboan had the same amount of consensus (PCI2= 
0.410) for their agreement with the survey question stating that fish wardens 
should be given stipends, regardless of whether  violators are caught or not. Both 
municipalities had a significantly less amount of consensus and more potential for 
conflict than Oslob (PCI2 = 0.250). 
 The amount of consensus for fishers from Oslob, Santander, and Samboan did not 
significantly differ in terms of their agreement and acceptability for fish gear 
registration, increase of fish for MPA establishment, and personal understanding 
of MPA regulations. 
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Table 9. Municipality comparisons of the amount of consensus for Fishers’ normative beliefs 
regarding the acceptability of sanctions for CRM  











2a. Boats not registered    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.250 0.450 2.66* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.250 0.530 3.72* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.450 0.530 0.87 
2b.Non-residents fishing in municipal waters    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.200 0.470 0.67 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.200 0.590 0.97 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.470 0.590 1.50 
2c.Cyanide fishing    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.170 0.100 1.41 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.170 0.400 2.53* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.100 0.400 3.42* 
2d.Unregistered fishers    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.470 0.590 2.02* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.470 0.560 1.47 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.590 0.560 0.42 
2e. Commercial fishing in municipal waters    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.160 0.230 1.05 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.160 0.430 3.26* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.230 0.430 2.12* 
2f. Residents fishing in MPA no-take zone    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.370 0.280 1.24 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.370 0.590 2.81* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.280 0.590 3.50* 
2g. Larger fines for non-residents fishing in MPA no-take zone    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.100 0.300 3.00* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.100 0.550 6.01* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.300 0.550 2.73 
2h. Use of fine mesh nets    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.380 0.410 0.48 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.380 0.630 3.94* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.410 0.630 2.96* 
2i.Compressor fishing    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.110 0.220 1.68 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.110 0.440 4.19* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.220 0.440 2.40* 
2j.Taking giant clams    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.390 0.370 0.32 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.390 0.600 2.99* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.370 0.600 2.87* 
2k. Off-season fishing for rabbit fish/Dariday    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.370 0.470 1.59 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.370 0.650 4.74* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.470 0.650 2.62* 
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Table 9 Continued. 









2l.Use of surface gill net    
Oslob vs. Santander 0.440 0.350 1.42 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.440 0.540 1.41 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.350 0.540 2.41* 
2m.Dynamite fishing    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.180 0.180 0.00 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.180 0.370 2.07* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.180 0.370 1.88 
2n.Baby muro ami fising    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.310 0.220 1.28 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.310 0.390 0.85 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.220 0.390 1.66 
2o.Lack of building permits for foreshore structures    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.190 0.220 0.45 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.190 0.400 2.41* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.220 0.400 1.87 
2p.Fishing with superlights    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.170 0.240 0.99 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.170 0.380 2.43* 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.240 0.380 1.42* 
2q.Cutting of Mangroves    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.190 0.170 0.34 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.190 0.360 1.85 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.170 0.360 1.95 
2r. Fish Pot Use    
Oslob. vs. Santander 0.520 0.410 2.13* 
Oslob vs. Samboan 0.520 0.510 0.17 
Santander vs. Samboan 0.410 0.510 1.55 
1
PCI a = first PCI value of the comparison. For example, PCI a corresponds to the PCI value of Oslob 
in the comparison of Oslob versus Santander 
2
PCI b = second PCI value of the comparison. For example, PCI b corresponds to the PCI value of 
Santander in the comparison of Oslob versus Santander 
* PCI difference tests larger than 1.96 are significant at p < .05. 
*The numbers and letters associated with the CRM scenario/policy correspond to section II of the 
survey. For example, “2a Boats not registered to mark MPA” corresponds to the question 2a of 
section II in the survey
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Table 9 highlights: 
 Generally, fishers from Oslob (e.g., PCI2 = 0.12) had the most amount of 
consensus for their agreement with sanctions applied to the CRM scenarios listed 
in Table 10. 
 Fishers from Samboan generally had the least amount of consensus and the 
greatest potential for conflict. This situation is particularly evident for Samboan’s 
larger PCI2 of 0.650 as compared to Oslob’s PCI2 of 0.370 regarding the 
consensus for sanctions applied to off-season fishing for rabbit fish or Dariday 
(2k). 
 Santander fishers had the least amount of consensus and greatest potential for 
conflict (PCI2=0.59) for sanctions applied to unregistered fishers (2d).  
 Oslob and Santander did not statistically differ for their amount of consensus 
regarding dynamite and cyanide fishing. Samboan had a statistically less amount 
of consensus than Oslob and Santander regarding cyanide(2c) and dynamite 
fishing(2m) (PCI2 =.47) 
 Sanctions applied to fish pot/bubo use (2r) will likely create conflict for Oslob 
fishers, as shown by their PCI2=.52. 
 The amount of consensus for sanctions applied to baby muro ami fishing (2n) did 
not statistically differ among fishers from all three municipalities.  The PCI2 for 
all three municipalities were relatively small, indicating more consensus and less 
potential for conflict regarding baby muro ami fishing. This situation could 
indicate that the norm or standard for muro ami fishing an illegal fishing method 
is well established and enforced within the municipalities. 
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Survey Section III. Fishers’ Behavioral Support and Intentions for CRM 
policies and initiatives 
 






Oslob, Santander, and Samboan combined 72.0 28.0 
Oslob 81.4 18.6 
Santander 74.2 25.8 
Samboan 41.8 58.2 
Santander and Samboan upland barangays 68.5 31.5 
Santander and Samboan coastal barangays 56.5 40.5 
1
Reponses are based on survey section III, question 9 asking “Would you say that you generally 
support most of the municipality’s coastal management initiatives and regulations?” 
 
Table 10 highlights: 
 Generally, most fishers from all municipalities support most of the CRM policies 
and initiatives. 
 58.2% of fishers from Samboan appeared to not support the most of the CRM 
initiatives and policies. 
 Upland barangays were more supportive (68.5%) of CRM policies and initiatives 
than coastal barangays (56.5%) 
 Table 11. Fishers’ support for institutions promoting CRM 





Are you affiliated with any non-governmental organization in 
your municipality (e.g. World Vision and Coastal Conservation 
Education Foundation)?  
11.8 88 0.2 
Is there a cooperative or People’s Organizations (PO) that 
addresses issues within your MPA?  
14 12.9 73.1 
Have you attended any meetings focused on managing your 
community’s coastal waters? 
23.1 73.9 0 
 
Table 11 barangays: 
 Majority  (88%) of the fishers surveyed were not affiliated with an NGO in their 
municipality 
 73% of fishers were unaware of the presence of PO within their municipality 
 Majority of the fishers have not attended public meetings about CRM. 
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Oslob, Santander, and Samboan combined 50.6 49.4 
Oslob 56.7 43.3 
Santander 45.3 54.7 
Samboan 36.9 60.7 
Santander and Samboan upland barangays 69.8 30.2 
Santander and Samboan coastal barangays 32.5 67.5 
1
 Active fish gear included the use of sagiwsiw or surface gill net, set floating gill net, double net or 
entangling gill net, compressor diving,  paglamba or hitting the water with drift gill net, Danish 
seine, baby muro ami or drive in with seine, long line, and fish pots. Some of these methods (e.g. 
fish pots) may be not be considered as active gear because of the differing methods associated with 
the fish gear. R.A. 8550 considers active fishing gear as a fishing device characterized by gear 
movements, and/or the pursuit of the target species by towing, lifting, and pushing the gears, 
surrounding, covering, dredging, pumping and scaring the target species to impoundments.   
 
Table 12 highlights: 
 Half of the fishers (50.6%) surveyed use active fish gear 
 Over half of the fishers from Oslob (56.7%) use active fish gear. Sagiwsiw or 
surface gill net is used by 4% (n = 11) of the fishers from Oslob, baby muro ami 
or drive in gill net is used by 1.4% (n = 4), and fish pots are used 3.6% (n = 10). 
 Samboan and Santander mostly use inactive fish gear 
 Upland barangays of Samboan and Santander use more active gear (69.8%) as 
compared to coastal barangays (32.5%). 
 The conscientious effort of not using active gear may be a form of public support 
for CRM. 
Table 13. Fish gear and methods most often used  
Fish Method Frequency/Count % 
Hook and Line 233 50.5 
Sagiwsiw 2 0.4 
Set Floating Gill Net 4 0.9 
Double Net 54 11.7 
Spear Fishing 34 7.4 
Hitting the water 1 0.2 
Danish Seine 6 1.3 
long line 6 1.3 
squid jigger 1 0.2 
fish pots 13 2.8 
bag net 2 0.4 
ring net 92 20.0 
Dip Net 2 0.4 





Table 13 highlights: 
 Hook and line appears to be used by half of the fishers surveyed. Ring net is the 
next method most often used. 
Section IV. Demographics of Fishers 
Table 14. Part-time Fisher  
 Frequency/Count % 
Part-time Fishers
1
 305 62 
Full –time fishers 187 38 
1
Part time fishers corresponded to fishers that had other forms of livelihood other than fishing 
   Table 15. Occupations for part-time fishers 
Occupations Frequency/Count % 
Farming 200 66.9 
Tricycle Driver 8 2.7 
Fish Warden 7 2.3 
Fish seller 7 2.3 




Carpenter (Panday) 13 4.3 
Other 52 17.4 




Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation 
5.63 5 6 2.57 
      1
Household size referred to the number of people residing within a household 
156 
 








Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation 
2.65 2.00 2.00 2.00 
1
Education level corresponded to whether they have finished elementary school (1) , completed 
elementary schools (2), taken some high school classes (3), completed high school (4), graduated 
from high school, undergone vocational school (5), taken some college classes (6), graduated 
from college(7).  
 
Table 17 highlights: 
 The average level of education completed consisted of completing elementary school and 
taking some high school classes. 
Table 18. Formal education completed by fishers 
Education Level Frequency/Count % 
Did not finish elementary school 94 19.3 
Elementary 171 35.2 
Some high school 90 18.5 
High school graduate 105 21.6 
Vocational School 2 .4 
Some college 16 3.3 
College graduate 7 1.4 
Other 1 .2 
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Figure 11. Fishers’ education level 
 
 
Table 19. Average age of fishers surveyed 
Age 
Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation 
44 44 40 12.24 
 
Table 20. Residents and non-resident fishers surveyed 
Residence
1
 Frequency/Count % 
Resident 471 96.3 
Non-resident 18 3.7 
1




SURVEY INSTRUMENT (CEBUANO) 
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Local Perceptions of Coastal Resource 





Ang sanktuaryo ang usa sa mga pamaagi sa pagdumala as kadagatan. Para ma hapsay ang 
pagdumala sa kadagatan sa inyong lungsod, kinhanglan sila ug impormasyon bahin sa mga huna 
huna sa mangingisda bahin sa mga balaud ug pamaagi sa pagdumala sa kadagatan. I ipon ang 
mga tubag sa mga gi pangutana ninyo para makahibaw ang lungsod sa kaauyuhan sa mga mga 
manginisda. 
 
Dili mi mo sulat sa inyong pangalan kay ang inyong mga tubag ug huna huna dili i saba sa 
uban sa mga tao . Kinhanglan maminaw ang lungsod sa inyong mga opinion o huna huna 
para na’y masabtan ang inyong munsipyo sa pag apekto sa sanktuaryo ug an uban mga 
balaud sa kadagatan sa inyong kinabuhi. 
 
Kinahanglan ihatag ang inyong tinuoray na huna huna sa inyong dughan. Lahi na ang “sunod” ug 














1) Nakahibaw ka ba nga naay sanktuaryo sa kadagtan sa inyong  munisipyo? ___ Oo    ___ Wala nakahibaw 
     
 Kung nakahibaw ka (Oo) , palihug itubag ang mga gi-pangutana:  
 
















        1              2      3                       4                  5    
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                       1            2                     3                     4                    5  
Nganong mao ni ang imong gi bati? 
      
 
 
7) Naa bay mga zone o lugar sa inyong sanktuaryo na puede maka pangisda ? ___Oo___Wala___ Wala ko 
kahibalu 
















      1            2                      3                      4                   5 
8)  Na-uyon ka ba sa balaud sa sanktuaryo na gi guinadili ang….. 









a) Tanang klase sa panagat sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Pagpanginhas sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Pagpanguha ug korals (gasang o guso) sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Pagpanguha ug balas sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Pagpanguha ug bato sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Paghimo ug mga estruktura o edipisyo daplin sa baybay sa 
sanktuaryo (apil ang sea wall) 
1 2 3 4 5 
g) Pagdalag sakayan sa panahon sa hunas sa sulud sa sanktuaryo  1 2 3 4 5 
h) Pag-ankla sa pump boat sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Pag-agi sa pumpboat nga nagpaandar ug makina sa sulud sa 
sanktuaryo 




9) Naghatag ba ang inyong munisipyo/lungsod ug programa na gi tawag ug “supplemental livelihood programs”  
(panaliptan     pagpahatag ug baboy)? ___Oo  ___Dili ___ Wala ko nakahibalu 
















     1         2                 3                     4                      5               




















1) Palihug pag-ingon kung naka-uyon ka ba sa mga gi ingon o gibutyag bahin sa balaud ug paagi sa pagdumala 
sa kadagatan 
 








a. Kinhanglan dungagan ang mga buya o pataw para masbtan sa 
katawhan asa ang sanktuaryo 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Dili puedi mangisda sa sulud sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Ang pamasol gitugot sa daplin sa sanktuaryo (dili sa sulud, sa 
daplin lang) 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. Kinahanglan naay mga lugar o “zone” para sa paggamit ug bubo sa 
gawas sa sanktuaryo 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Ang mga balaud bahin sa sanktuaryo kinhanglan gi plano sa mga 
consehal ug vice-mayor sa munispyo  
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Kinhanglan ang organisayon sa katawhan (PO) mao gyud mo 
dumala sa sanktuaryo 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Kinahanglan ihatag ang barangay ug porsyento sa negosyo o kita 
na gi kuha sa dive user fee  
1 2 3 4 5 
   h. May kakulang sa komunikasyon ang organisayon sa katawahan 
(PO) ug ang lungsod.  
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Maminaw ang taga munisipyo sa mga huna-huna sa barangay bahin 
sa pagdumala sa sanktuaryo  
1 2 3 4 5 
j. Kinahanglan hatagun ug honararium ang mga Bantay Dagat, bisag 
wala na ka kuha sila ug mga  mga masinupakun sa balaud sa 
sanktuaryo 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Kinahanglan tagaon ug porciento ang maga Bantay Dagat sa 
negosyo o kita gikan sa multa sa mga masinupakun sa balaud sa 
kadagatan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
l. Lisud ang pagkuha o pagpagawas sa kwarta pinaagi sa general fund 
para sa mga kinahanglan sa mga operasyon sa Bantay Dagat. 
1 2 3 4 5 
m.  Kinahanglan ug trust fund para sa mga operasyon sa Bantay 
Dagat 
1 2 3 4 5 
n. Maka salig ko sa kasagaran sa pulis nga mo suporta sa kalihukan 
sa Batay Dagat  
1 2 3 4 5 
o.Kasagaran, andam ang pulis sa pagsuporta sa kalihukan sa 
kadagatan uban sa Bantay Dagat 
1 2 3 4 5 
p. Kinhanglan ug balaud bahin sa pag gamit sa pagpanagat  1 2 3 4 5 
q. Kinahanglan maghatag ang munispyo ug “fishing permit” o 
lisensya para makapanagat ang mga dili taga inyong lungsod. 
1 2 3 4 5 
r. Kinahanglan i-registro ang imohang mga gamit para sa pagpanagat 1 2 3 4 5 




t. Kasagaran sa mga isda nga nakuha sa mga mangingisda nga taga 
diri kinahanglan ibaligya sa atong lungsod. 
1 2 3 4 5 
u. Ni daghan ang mga isda diri pag kasugod sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
v. Ni daghan ang akong nakuha na isda pag ka sugod sa sanktuaryo 1 2 3 4 5 
w. Ang sanktuaryo ang pinka-unang rason nga ni daghan ang akong 
nakuha na isda   
1 2 3 4 5 
x. Ang mga programa sa pagtudlo sa katawhan o information drives 
(pananglitan fisheries seminar) makapadani sa benepisyo sa 
sanktuaryo. 
1 2 3 4 5 
y. Wala ko kasabut sa katuyuan sa mga balaud bahin sa pagdumala sa 
kadagatan 
1 2 3 4 5 
2) Palihug ihatag ang imong na-uyunan bahin sa pagdumula (pananglitan multahun) sa mga situasyon (apil ang 




2) Pangisda ba ang una nimong panginabuhi (full time fisher)? 
____Oo ____Dili 
Kung Oo, palihug pag isulti ang imong tubag:  
1a) Ang kadagatan sa lungsod, sugod sa baybay hangtud sa kinsi (15) km kung walay isla. Kung adunay 
isla kini paga-tungaon sa duha sa isla. 
        Kasagaran, mangisda ba ka sa sulud o sa gawas sa kadagatan sa munispyo?  








a. Mga pamb boat na wala gi registro sa lungsod sa inyong 
kadagatan 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Dili taga sa lungsod na nangisda sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Naggamit ug makahilo sa pangisda  sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Mga mangingisda na wala na ma registro sa munisipyo 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Mga kubkub nangisda sa sulud sa kadagatan sa Munisipyo  1 2 3 4 5 
f. Ang mga mangingisda sa inyong lungsod na ngisda sa sulud  
sa sanktuaryo 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Mas dakug multa sa mangisda na dili taga lungsod na ngisda 
 sa  sulud sa sanktuaryo 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Naggamit ug fine mesh nets o mga pukot pino ug mata (mas 
 pino sa 3 na gidakun)   
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Compressor fishing  sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
j. Nanguha ug “taklobo” o suliut  sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
k. Nagisda ug dariday pag ban season (May- Oct).  sa inyong  
kadagatan 
1 2 3 4 5 
l. Naggamit ug “sagiwsiw” (pan hadlok sa isda )  sa inyong  
dagatan 
1 2 3 4 5 
m. Naggamit ug dinamita  sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
n. Nag siroska o “baby muro ami” (15 ka buok na tao) sa  
inyong ong kadagatan 
1 2 3 4 5 
o. Naggama ug structura o edipsiyo dapit sa kabaybayun  
(apil ang sea wall) na walay permit sa kadagatan   
1 2 3 4 5 
p. Naggamit ug super lights sa pangisda (>1000 watts)  sa  
inyong kadagatan 
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Nagputul ug magroves o tungog  sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
r. Naggamit ug bubo sa inyong kadagatan 1 2 3 4 5 
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•  sa sulud sa kadagatan sa munisipyo/lungsod (panalitan, kung taga Santander ka, mangisda ba ka sa 
kadagatan sa Santander 
 •  sa gawas sa kadagatan sa munispyo/lungsod   
        Kung gawas sa kadagatan sa lungsod, asa man nga kadagatan o lugar?_______________________  
2) Part-time fisher o mangisda ka usahay ba __Oo __ Dili 
     2a) Kung Oo, Unsa ang uban na imong mga kinabuhi? 
 •  Mag-uma  •  namaligya ug isda    •  Uban 
 •  Tricyle driver    •     dive resort employee 
 •  Bantay Dagat    •      barangay council  
 
3) Kung part-time o full time fisher ka, palihug itubag sa mga gi-pananghid: 
      3a) unsa ang imong igamit sa pangisda? 
         •   1) Pamasol      5) Compressor   9) panahid  •   13) pang-nukus  •  17) pukot 
(ring net) 
         •   2) Sagiwsiw (pamalu)               6) Pamana  10) Bungsod •   14) Bubó  18) uban 
         •   3) Pamarungoy (pamayagkag)  • 7) Panggito •   11) Siroska •   15) Tapay Tapay  
         •   4) Double Net       8) panglamba    12) Palangre •   16) Kub kub  
          
      3b) Kasagaran, unsa ang imong primerong o perming gamiton sa pangisda (Pagsulti ug usa sa imong 
gamiton sa pangisda)?         
             ___________________________________________________________________________ 
4) Adu’nay bay pagpasabut kabahin sa tuyuan sa sanktuaryo?__Oo __ Dili 
5) Adunay bay pagpasabut kabahin sa pamalaud sa kadaagatan gikan sa lungsod? __Oo ___Dili 
6) Naka apil ba ka sa mga miting/seminar kabahin sa pagdumala sa inyong kadagatan?  ___ Oo ___Dili   
   Kung naka-apil ka, palihug isulti imong tubag sa mga gi-pangutana: 
            6a)  Naka apil ka ba ug mga seminar ning nang labay nga unum (6) ka buwan? ___ Oo ___Dili 
            6b) Palihug  i-tubag ang pinka a unang rason sa pag apil ining miting or seminar 
                    •   a) Kining seminar makatabang sa pagpasabut sa mga problema bahin sa kadagatan  
                   •   b) Maka estorya ko sa uban na katawhan na interesado kabahin sa kadagatan 
                   •   c) Maminaw ang tao sa akong opinion o huna huna kabahin sa sa kadagatan 
                   •   d) Gusto ko makatauon sa pag proteger sa kadagatan sa lungsod 
                   •   e) Uban na rason____________________________ 
    6c) Kung wala ka nakaapil, unsa ang imong pinaka-unang mga rason na wala ka nag apil ining mga 
miting/seminar        
          •   a) naa koy lain na obligasyon  
         •   b) dili maminaw ang tao sa akong gi hunana kabahin sa kadagatan 
 •           c) Wala koy nakahibawan kabahin sa pagdumala sa sanktuaryo para sa pag apil ining miting/sanktuaryo 
         •   d) Wala ko gi pahibaw-a nga na’y miting 
         •   e) wala koy panahon para ana  
         •   f) Uban na rason____________________________ 
7) Na-bay gi-tawag ug organisasyon sa katawhan (PO) kabahin sa inyong sanktuaryo?___Oo ___Dili ___ Wala 
ko nahibalo 
           Kung naa, palihug I sugot ang mga gi pananghid/questions 
            7a) Nasakop o apil ba ka ining organisasyon? ___Oo ___Dili 
             7b) Unsa ang pangalan sa inyong PO? 
             7c)  Wanu man nag apil ka sa inyong PO?  
        ______________________________________________________________________________ 
        ______________________________________________________________________________ 
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8) Nagapasakop ka ba sa usa sa ogranisasyon sa NGO (apil ang World Vision ug an CCEF) ?___Oo ___Dili 
9) Maka-ingon ka ba na mo suporta gyud ka sa kasagaran sa mga paagi ug balaud kabahin sa kadagatan sa 
lungsod? ___Oo ___Dili 
 Nganong mao ni ang imong gi-bati? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
              
Section IV. 
 
1) Lunsuranun ka ba? __Oo___ Dili  
   
 Kung lungsuranun ka, pila ka tuig nag puyo ka aning lungsora? 
    ____0-5 yrs 
    ____5-10 yrs 
    ____ mas pa sa 10yrs 
    Kung dili, taga asa mang kang lungsod?_____________ 
3) Unsa man ang imong nahuman sa imong pageskuela?I-Check ang imong nahuman 
   wala ka human sa Elementary 
   Elementary      wala ka human sa college  
   wala ka human high school    College graduate 
   High school graduate     wala ka human sa graduate school 
   Technical/Vocational school (TESDA)   Graduate degree (M.S. or Phd) 
1) Unsa ang imong sekso? ___Babae ___Lalake 
2) Unsa ang imong primerong panginabuhi?____________ 
3) Pila ka buuk na tao na nagpuyo sa inyong balay?  ____ 
 





Translated Survey Instrument 
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Local Perceptions of Coastal 




Coastal Resource Management includes the management of your municipality’s coastal waters, 
including Marine Protected Areas (MPA’s). MPA’s may provide a variety of benefits to 
community residents in southeastern Cebu. In order to manage your municipality’s coastal 
waters, your local government unit need good information about how people feel about the 
management initiatives and regulations of their coastal waters. This survey is designed to collect 
this type of information. 
   
While your participation in this survey is voluntary, we would appreciate your help.   
 
We are interested in what you believe. Please don’t ask other people for their opinions.  If you do 
not have one, simply mark the no opinion option in the survey. The best answers are the ones that 
most closely reflect your own feelings and beliefs. Your responses will be kept strictly 
confidential. 
 
Please answer all the questions in the survey.  It takes about twenty minutes to complete.   
 




1) Are you aware that an MPA exists within your municipal waters? ___ Yes    ___ No 
           If yes,  please answer the following questions below: 
               














  1       2                3                    4                      5                          
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                     1       2                3                      4                    5 
6a. Why do you feel this way?______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________  
7) Are there specific fishing zones within your MPA? ___Yes___No 














 1       2                3                      4                   5 





Disagree Strongly  
disagree 
a. Prohibition of all types of fishing  1 2 3 4 5 
b. Prohibition of gleaning for sea life (including 
sea urchins, sea weed, mollusks) 
1 2 3 4 5 
c. Prohibition of taking corals 1 2 3 4 5 
d. Prohibition of taking sand 1 2 3 4 5 
e. Prohibition of taking rocks  1 2 3 4 5 
f. Prohibition of building any foreshore structure 
including sea walls and jetties 
1 2 3 4 5 
g. Prohibition of paddle boats during low tide 1 2 3 4 5 
h. Prohibition of anchoring within MPA 1 2 3 4 5 
i. Prohibition of motorized vessels 1 2 3 4 5 
9) Does your municipality have supplemental livelihood programs (e.g swine dispersal)? ___Yes  ___No 














           1                   2              3                     4                      5               


















1.  Below are a series of statements about your Municipality’s coastal management initiatives and 
regulations. Please rate your level of agreement with these statements. 










a. More bouys are needed so that people know the 
location of the MPA 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Fishing is not allowed inside the MPA 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Hook and line fishing should be allowed in the buffer 
zone of the MPA 
1 2 3 4 5 
d. There should be designated areas for using fish pots 
outside the sanctuary 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. MPA regulations and initiatives must be planned by 
the counselors and vice-mayor of the municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Fisher or People Organizations (PO’s) should manage 
their MPA 
1 2 3 4 5 
g.  A percentage of revenues from dive user fees should 
be given to the community 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. There is a lack of communication between the 
municipal local government unit (LGU) and fisher 
organizations regarding coastal management issues 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. The community’s opinions are taken into consideration 
by the LGU during management decisions concerning 
our MPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 
j. The fish wardens should be given an honorarium 
regardless of whether they catch fishing violators or not 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. As an incentive for fish wardens, a percentage of the 
revenues made from fishing violation fines should be 
given to the Fish Warden operations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
l.  It is difficult to take funds from the municipality’s 
general fund for fish warden operations 
1 2 3 4 5 
m. A trust fund is needed to support fish warden 
operations 
1 2 3 4 5 
n. I trust the Philippine National Police (PNP) to support 
Fish Warden operations 
1 2 3 4 5 
o. The PNP is always ready to provide security and 
support to Fish Warden operations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
p. There should be regulations on the type of fish gear 
used within the Municipal waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Fishing permits should be given to non-resident 
fishers 
1 2 3 4 5 
r. One must register fishing gear with the municipality 1 2 3 4 5 
s. There are benefits from the municipality when one is a 
registered fisher 
1 2 3 4 5 
t. Most of the fish caught by resident fishers should be 
sold within our municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
  u. Fish populations have increased since the 
establishment of our MPA. 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. My fish catch has increased since the establishment of 
the MPA 
1 2 3 4 5 
w. The sanctuary is the main reason why my fish catch 
has increased  
1 2 3 4 5 
x. Information drives such as fisheries workshops 
convince me of MPA benefits 
1 2 3 4 5 
y. I don’t understand the rules and regulations pertaining 
to coastal resource management 
1 2 3 4 5 
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2. Please rate your level of agreement concerning management actions (e.g fines) for fishing violations 
listed below:  
 
Section III 
1) Is fishing your primary occupation (full time fisher)? ____Yes ____No 
If yes,  please respond the following questions: 
 Your municipality’s waters start from the shoreline and extend to 15 km. If there is an island 
within 15km, your  municipality’s waters are evenly divided between the other island.  
     1a) Where do you commonly fish?  
 •  inside your municipalities waters 
 •  outside your municipalities waters  
             1b) If you fish outside your municipality’s waters, then what other places do you fish? Please be as 
specific  
             as possible. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
2) Are you a part-time fisher? ___Yes  ____No                                                                                           
  2a) If yes, what else do you do for a living? 
   •  farming  •  fish seller   •  other 
 •  tricycle driver   •  dive resort employee 
 •  Fish Warden  •  Community local government 
 
3) If you are a part-time or full-time fisher, please answer the following questions below:  











a. Boats not registered with Local Government Unit 
within your municipal waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
b. Non-residents fishing in your municipal waters 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Cyanide Fishing  within your municipal waters  1 2 3 4 5 
d. Fishing in municipal waters without proper 
registration with Municipality 
1 2 3 4 5 
e. Unauthorized commercial fishing within 10-15 km 
zone from shoreline 
1 2 3 4 5 
f. Residents fishing within the MPA 1 2 3 4 5 
g. Larger fines for non-residents fishing within the 
MPA 
1 2 3 4 5 
h. Use of fine mesh nets (mesh size finer than 3 cm in 
width) within your waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
i. Compressor fishing  within your municipal waters  1 2 3 4 5 
j. Taking Giant clams or “taklubo” within your 
municipal waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
k. Fishing for Siganids during the closed season (May- 
Oct) within your municipal waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
l.“Sagiwsiw” fishing within municipal waters 1 2 3 4 5 
m. Fishing with explosives 1 2 3 4 5 
n. Fishing using “baby muro ami” methods 1 2 3 4 5 
o. Building foreshore structures (e.g. sea walls) without 
permit from local government unit by  your municipal 
waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
p. Fishing with super lights(>1000 watts) in your 
municipal waters 
1 2 3 4 5 
q. Cutting of Mangroves by your municipal waters 1 2 3 4 5 
r. Using fish pots or bubo  in your municipal waters 1 2 3 4 5 
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 1) Hook and Line  • 7) Otter trawl 13) squid jigger       
•  2) Sagiwsiw              8) hitting the water                        • 14) fish pots            
 3) Set floating gill net   9) Boat/ Danish seine 15) bag net               
•  4) double net        10) Fish coral • 16) Purse seine 
•  5) compressor diving 11) Baby muro ami         17) ring net 
•  6) Spear Fishing  12) long line 18) others_____ 
 
        3b) Which fish method do you most often use? ________________________________   
4) Has the municipality set-up any educational programs that focus only on the purpose of your 
MPA?___Yes ____No 
5) Has the municipality set-up any educational programs focus on the purpose of regulating your 
municipality’s coastal waters? ___Yes ____No 
6) Have you attended any meetings focused on managing your community’s coastal waters? ____Yes  
____No 
If yes, please answer the following questions: 
 6a) Have you attended these meetings in the past 6 months? ____Yes  ____No 
         6b) Please state your main reason for attending these public meetings? 
          •    These meetings help me to understand current issues within our municipalities coastal waters 
         •    I get to meet other members of the community that are interested in this topic 
         •    My opinions are taken into consideration during the meeting 
         •    I want to learn about protecting the municipalties coastal waters 
         •   Other reasons___________________________________________________ 
       6c) If no, please check the following reasons for not attending these public meetings. 
           •   other obligations during scheduled meeting time 
          •   my opinion or voice in these meetings are not taken into consideration 
          •   I am not well-informed enough to attend these meetings 
          •   I was unaware that there was a meeting 
          •   I don’t have the time to attend to these meetings 
          •   other_________________________________________________ 
7) Is there a cooperative or People’s Organizations (PO) that addresses issues within your MPA?  
   ____Yes    ____No  ____ Don’t know    
         If yes, please answer the following questions: 
          7a) Are you a part of this PO or cooperative? __ Yes  ___No 
          7b) Please name the organization(s)/cooperatives you are involved with: ______________________ 
             _______________________________________________________________________________ 
           7c) What are your reasons for joining these organizations/cooperatives?  ______________________ 
                ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8) Are you affiliated with any non-governmental organization in your municipality (e.g. World Vision and 
Coastal Conservation Education Foundation)? ___ Yes__No 
 
5) Would you say that you generally support most of the municipality’s coastal management initiatives 







1) Are you a resident of this municipality? __Yes  ___No 




    
2)    How much formal education have you completed?  Check one response. 
  Did not finish Elementary School 
   Elementary School     Some college  
   Some high school     College degree 
   High school degree     Some graduate school 
   Technical / vocational school    Graduate degree 
2) What is your sex? ___Male ___Female 
3) What is your primary occupation?____________ 
4) How many family members are living in your household?  ____   
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